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UNITED STATES REGULATION OF STEM CELL 
RESEARCH: RECASTING GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
AND QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED 
Owen C.B. Hughes* 
Alan L. Jakimo** 
Michael J. Malinowski*** 
Every progress in science in the last decades, from the moment it was 
absorbed into technology and thus introduced into the factual world 
where we live our everyday lives, has brought with it a veritable 
avalanche of fabulous instruments and ever more ingenious machinery. 
All of this makes it more unlikely every day that man will encounter 
anything in the world around him that is not man-made and hence is 
not, in the last analysis, he himself in a different disguise.1 
 - Hannah Arendt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Humans, like many other animals with central nervous systems, run 
under the control of biological clocks distributed among the various 
organs of their bodies and synchronized by a master clock located in 
their brains.2 Like an organism in which these clocks have been 
disconnected from their master, the many arms of United States federal 
and state law governing stem cell research and medicine exhibit a 
profound lack of synchronicity and varying degrees of “soft” and “hard” 
touch. This situation, we believe, results largely from the United States 
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) having been stymied since the late 
1970s from becoming a fully formed “master clock” for a nationwide, 
                                                          
 *  A collaboration among the authors on a panel presentation hosted by Hofstra University in 
March 2008 inspired this Article. Owen C.B. Hughes may be contacted at 
owencbhughes@gmail.com. 
 **  Alan L. Jakimo is a Partner in the New York office of Sidley Austin LLP and an adjunct 
Special Professor of Law at Hofstra University, and may be contacted at ajakimo@sidley.com. Any 
views expressed in this Article should not be attributed to the firm at which Mr. Jakimo practices, 
Hofstra University, or any other entity or person.  
 ***  Michael J. Malinowski is the Ernest R. and Iris M. Eldred Professor of Law, Paul M. 
Herbert Law Center, Louisiana State University and may be contacted at 
Michael.Malinowski@law.lsu.edu.   
 1. Hannah Arendt, The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 
2007, at 43, 52.  
 2. See generally COLD SPRING HARBOR SYMPOSIA ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY: CLOCKS 
AND RHYTHMS (2007) (discussing the biological clock mechanism of humans and other living 
beings).  
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perhaps worldwide, human embryology research program—one that 
includes the study of human embryonic stem cells (“hESCs”) and 
regenerative medicine.3 This is a role that the NIH has successfully 
achieved in many other areas of health science.4 A solution to this 
problem may be the invention in 2007 of induced pluripotent stem cells 
(“iPSCs”).5 Beyond iPSCs, the tantalizing potential looms for 
reprogramming adult somatic cells directly into other types of adult 
somatic cells without having to revert to pluripotent status.6 But even if 
these innovations may help resolve decades of ethical and religion-based 
debates over hESCs, a larger problem not specific to any technology 
remains: addressing the conflicts that now exist among federal and state 
governments over how best to regulate stem cell research and 
medicine—conflicts that arose in an environment without the NIH being 
able to play its historic lead role in shaping ethical, legal, and socially 
acceptable practices for this emerging area of health science. 
                                                          
 3. On April 17, 2009, subsequent to the submission of this Article, the NIH announced the 
availability for public comment of Draft Guidelines containing policies and procedures by which it 
proposes to fund extramural and conduct intramural human stem cell research. The publication of 
these Draft Guidelines marks the first step in the NIH’s implementation of President Barack 
Obama’s Executive Order, the stated purpose of which is to promote human stem cell research. See 
Draft National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 
18,578 (Apr. 23, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009); see also infra 
note 131. 
 4. See National Institutes of Health, www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2009) (“With the support of the American people, the NIH annually invests over $28 billion 
in medical research. More than 83% of the NIH’s funding is awarded through almost 50,000 
competitive grants to more than 325,000 researchers at over 3,000 universities, medical schools, and 
other research institutions in every state and around the world. About 10% of the NIH’s budget 
supports projects conducted by nearly 6,000 scientists in its own laboratories, most of which are on 
the NIH campus in Bethesda, Maryland.”). 
 5. iPSCs are pluripotent stem cells derived from human adult somatic cells and that exhibit 
many characteristics of, but are not identical to, human pluripotent stem cells derived from human 
blastocysts. See Junying Yu et al., Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human 
Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917, 1917 (2007); Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent 
Stem Cells from Adult Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 868 (2007). For the 
political significance of iPSCs, see, for example, President George W. Bush, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 28, 2008) (“On matters of life and science, we must trust in the innovative spirit of 
medical researchers and empower them to discover new treatments while respecting moral 
boundaries. In November, we witnessed a landmark achievement when scientists discovered a way 
to reprogram adult skin cells to act like embryonic stem cells. This breakthrough has the potential to 
move us beyond the divisive debates of the past by extending the frontiers of medicine without the 
destruction of human life.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Bruce Goldman, Smash the (Cell) State!, NATURE, Aug. 27, 2008, 
http://www.nature.com/stemcells/2008/0808/080827/full/stemcells.2008.115.html (last visited Feb. 
4, 2009). Adult somatic cells are cells in the body of an organism other than those that will become 
gametes (eggs and sperm). The word “adult” is somewhat of a misnomer in that the bodies of 
organisms ranging from newborns to what are normally considered to be adults are composed of 
adult somatic cells. 
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This Article probes this question of conflicts between present 
federal and state regulation of hESC research by comparing the federal 
Bayh-Dole Act (“Bayh-Dole” or the “Act”) regime for licensing patents 
claiming inventions funded by agencies of the U.S. government (such as 
the NIH) with the patent licensing regime of the California Institute for 
Regenerative Medicine (“CIRM”). CIRM is the agency of the State of 
California authorized and directed to fund hESC research through the 
issuance of $3 billion of general obligation bonds at an estimated cost of 
at least $6 billion payable over the next thirty years.7 Although, to date, 
eight other states have also adopted stem cell research funding programs, 
this Article centers on CIRM as the most ambitious state effort to fill a 
science-funding vacuum created through federal government law and 
policy.8 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the roles, 
relationships, and norms of government, academia, and industry in 
federal funding of research that evolved in the United States during the 
second half of the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.9 Part III covers the emergence, 
beginning as early as the 1970s, of federal laws and regulations relating 
to the study of human embryology and hESC research, the emergence of 
state law and regulation following the turn of the twentieth century into 
the twenty-first, and the resulting patchwork quilt that currently prevails. 
This discussion echoes a centuries-old theme of the impact on scientific 
progress when politics based on imperfect perception holds the purse 
strings tied around scientific research. Part IV explores in some detail 
how the trends, developments, stakes, and stakeholders described in 
Parts II and III intersect in the patent licensing regulations adopted by 
CIRM. This discussion particularly illustrates an unending debate on 
how to best translate patentable inventions funded by government into 
medicines and therapies for promoting the public health—a debate that 
goes back at least as far as the adoption of Bayh-Dole and to the debates 
                                                          
 7. Dean E. Murphy, Defying Bush Administration, Voters in California Back $3 Billion for 
Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P10.  
 8. New York, by way of the Empire State Stem Cell Board created in 2007, has committed 
$600 million to stem cell research. EMPIRE STATE STEM CELL BOARD, STRATEGIC PLAN 7, 
http://stemcell.ny.gov/plan_comment_form.php. Massachusetts, overriding the veto of Governor 
Mitt Romney, plans to create an institute for stem cell research and regenerative medicine at the 
University of Massachusetts. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Stem Cell Research, 
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). New Jersey was the 
first state to appropriate funds for both adult and embryonic stem cell research, and in 2005 and 
2006 it allocated a total of $23 million to the New Jersey Stem Cell Institute. Id.  
 9. See infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.  
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in the 1970s over federal funding of fetal tissue research.10 Through a 
comparative discussion of Bayh-Dole and CIRM, Part IV also illustrates 
a larger-scale problem—the jurisdictional conflicts that will exist in the 
field of stem cell research and regenerative medicine irrespective of 
whether hESCs, iPSCs, or any applicable substitute serves as its 
foundation. The Article concludes by asking stakeholders in stem cell 
research and regenerative medicine on a worldwide scale to consider 
adopting a more proactive approach to addressing these multi-
jurisdictional conflicts in policy and regulation that have arisen in the 
United States, as well as beyond the United States, over the past thirty 
years, owing in large part to a lack of coordination among the various 
government actors. 
II. UNITED STATES FEDERAL FUNDING: FROM ATOMIC BOMBS TO 
BIOTECH 
The threat of annihilation by technology during World War II 
(“WWII”)11 inspired aggressive United States investment to raise the 
base of science, which continues to this day.12 The impact on American 
research universities was profound—a definitive before and after: 
                                                          
 10. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text. 
 11. The uranium atom was split successfully in 1938. See National Atomic Museum, The 
Manhattan Project, http://www.atomicmuseum.com/Tour/manhattanproject.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 
2009). Fearing that the Nazis could and would develop an atomic bomb, the United States 
undertook the Manhattan Project to pre-empt them. Id. 
 12. See Titus Galama & James Hosek, U.S. Science Is Holding Its Own, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
July 9, 2008, at B7. According to one recent report on the state of United States investment in 
science relative to other nations: 
Although China, India and South Korea are starting to account for a significant portion 
of the world’s science and technology activities, and are showing rapid growth, they still 
account for a very small share of patents, science publications and citations. The United 
States, meanwhile, continues to invest in science and technology infrastructure, is 
creating significant employment in science and engineering, and benefits from the 
immigration of foreign-born science and engineering students and workers. 
Id. For detailed, timely data on research and development (“R&D”) expenditures, see National 
Science Foundation, Research and Development, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ 
showpub.cfm?TopID=8 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). The two largest R&D efforts of the war were the 
Manhattan Project and the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(“MIT”). ROGER L. GEIGER, RESEARCH AND RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE: AMERICAN RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITIES SINCE WORLD WAR II 7 (Transaction Pub. 2004) (1993). As Geiger notes of these 
two projects: 
In their objectives and management, they were almost mirror opposites. The first began 
as a rather diffuse undertaking, but gradually concentrated an enormous amount of 
science, engineering, and material resources upon the single goal of producing an atomic 
bomb. The second began with a single device—a British designed magnetron, the basis 
for effective microwave radar—and gradually proliferated into an entire industry with 
multiple products and applications.  
Id. 
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Research universities before World War II and research universities 
afterward are two different stories. The first is one of a (growing) 
handful of institutions seeking to advance to world-class standards in 
basic science and receiving an enormous boost from the great 
philanthropic foundations. The second is a story of a system of 
universities impelled forward by the demands and the resources of the 
federal government, but also guided by their own academic 
ambitions.13 
In fact, as discussed below, the American science research 
experience during and since WWII encompasses three distinguishable 
eras: the military-industrial complex (“MIC”) establishment era (1939 
into the 1940s); the academia-industry separation era (mid-1940s into 
the 1980s); and the academia-industry integration era (1980s to the 
present).14 The following discussion addresses each with a focus on the 
roles of and relationships among government, academia, and industry, 
and the resulting technology transfer and research and development 
infrastructure and norms. 
A. Military-Industrial Complex Era 
The Great Depression inspired generous government funding of 
civil works—roads, airports, bridges, buildings, and beyond—to put 
America back to work and stimulate the economy.15 Still, the United 
States entered WWII without a standing army or a meaningful 
                                                          
 13. GEIGER, supra note 12, at xiii. 
 14. Although beyond the focus and scope of this Article, there is another chapter in 
government science funding that must be mentioned—the “earmark era.” See generally Jeffrey 
Mervis, U.S. Research Earmarks: Building a Scientific Legacy on a Controversial Foundation, 321 
SCIENCE 480 (2008); see also Interview by Robert Frederick with Jeffrey Mervis, Deputy News 
Editor, Science Magazine, Science Magazine Podcast (July 25, 2008), available at 
http://podcasts.aaas.org/science_podcast/SciencePodcast_080725.mp3 (transcript on file with the 
Hofstra Law Review). This era was launched by two projects funded by Congress decades ago: a 
$32 million appropriation in the late 1970s that allowed Tufts University to build a nutrition center 
in downtown Boston, and a $14.2 million appropriation in 1983-84 that enabled Catholic University 
of America to erect a four-story science building in Washington, D.C. See Mervis, supra, at 480. 
Earmarks, often referred to as “pork barrel projects,” are funding directives by Congress without 
agency involvement, peer review, or substantial scrutiny by congressional committees. See id. 
“Most scientists, and their professional organizations, look down their noses at earmarks. They see 
them as a threat to the merit review process that most federal agencies use to fund basic science.” 
Id. Nevertheless, science earmarks have increased steadily and significantly since the Tufts 
appropriation, culminating in $4.5 billion in 2008. Id.  
 15. See Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. 
REV. 515, 517-19 (2003). These direct project appropriations were the predecessor for the earmark 
era in government science funding, which is addressed supra note 14.  
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infrastructure of military weapons manufacturers.16 In science and 
technology, the war effort necessitated direct, intense interaction among 
government, industry, and academia with complete focus on 
application.17 The federal government became a contract purchaser of 
inventions from both academia and industry.18 The country left WWII 
with established, expansive, and ongoing relationships between the 
armed forces and private industry suppliers, and financial support of the 
same became a permanent, major expenditure and budget priority.19 
President Eisenhower appreciated the scope of this Rubicon-like 
crossing and its impact on future generations,20 which he shared in his 
Farewell Address to the Nation broadcast by radio on January 17, 1961: 
  Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our 
industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution 
during recent decades.  
  In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes 
more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is 
conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. 
  Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been 
overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing 
fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the 
fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a 
revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs 
involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for 
intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds 
of new electronic computers. 
                                                          
 16. At the time of the nation’s founding, the country called up troops only when needed or 
used militias, but did not make an organized military a permanent fixture until after WWII. Jesse 
Smith, Introduction to JESSE SMITH, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE NATION 3, 3 (2006). According to the Department of 
Defense’s Fiscal Year 2007 Baseline Report, there are 1,899,074 military personnel in the United 
States and its territories, and the United States military is present at more than 823 installations 
outside of the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2007 
BASELINE 22, 76 (2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/BSR_2007_Baseline.pdf. 
 17. GEIGER, supra note 12, at 7 (“Given the absolute priority of the war effort, the usual 
academic tasks of universities were largely displaced for the duration.”). Moreover, it is important 
to note that “[t]he basic relationship between the federal government and universities for conducting 
wartime research was governed by contracts negotiated according to the principle of no-loss and no-
gain. Universities were reimbursed for the direct costs they incurred and also given some allowance 
for overhead.” Id. at 6. This relationship provided the precedent for “administrative overhead” that 
later became commonplace with federal grant funding for bench research. 
 18. See id. at 7. 
 19. See Smith, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
 20. See id. at 3-4. President Dwight Eisenhower coined the phrase “military-industrial-
complex” in his Farewell Address, which was broadcast to the American people via radio. Id. at 5.  
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  The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal 
employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever 
present—and is gravely to be regarded. 
  Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we 
should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that 
public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-
technological elite. 
  It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate 
these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our 
democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free 
society.21 
As President Eisenhower predicted, the MIC has continued and 
expanded post-WWII, raging through the Cold War and today 
culminating with the War on Terror.22 However, to prevent the 
“domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project 
allocations, and the power of money[,]”23 the federal government also 
has been a strong supporter and generous funder of peer-reviewed, 
civilian-focused research by academic and government laboratories—
especially in the human health sciences.24 For decades this duality 
contributed to separation between academia and industry, but now, 
following a change in federal technology transfer law and policy in the 
1980s,25 we are decades deep into an era of extensive integration and 
unprecedented advancement in biomedical science.26 
B. The Era of Separation 
Academia and industry worked in tandem during WWII as part of 
the national war effort. With the war over, they largely separated,27 as 
their traditionally different cultures and priorities re-emerged; supportive 
                                                          
 21. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1038-39 
(Jan. 17, 1961).  
 22. See Smith, supra note 16, at 7-8.  
 23. Eisenhower, supra note 21, at 1039. 
 24. See generally GEIGER, supra note 12. Generous NIH funding of biomedical research was 
introduced in the 1950s, and increased exponentially during the final decades of the last century to 
remain constant with the price of biomedical R&D. For an NIH chart illustrating this, see 
http://report.nih.gov/award/research/RG_Current_Constant_Dollars_Chart.ppt (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009). 
 25. See infra Part II.C.  
 26. See Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Realizing the Promise of Genomics in 
Biomedical Research, 294 JAMA 1399, 1401-02 (2005); see also Symposium, Proceedings of “The 
Genomics Revolution? Science, Law, and Policy,” 66 LA. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
 27. These relationships did not separate entirely, for academia-industry relationships were 
established by the MIC that continued on, while more were forged as the MIC expanded, and the 
general base in science and technology rose. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
390 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:383 
federal science policy supported and funded separate tracks of 
engagement with each; and United States intellectual property law and 
policy pushed them apart.28 During WWII, the federal government had 
been a contract purchaser of inventions from both academia and 
industry.29 Industry was cautious about commingling its investments in 
researchers and institutions with government funding through mutual 
relationships, which raised a risk of government claims to invention.30 
Also, many in academia were eager to return to the funding and cultural 
norms that predated WWII: enablement of land grant and other public 
universities by significant state government funding and tuition, and 
enablement of private schools from higher tuitions and major 
philanthropic funding.31 Tuition coverage from the GI Bill expanded 
enrollment and increased tuition revenue, which benefited universities in 
general.32 
Still, in some parts of academia a lingering appetite for federal 
government funding and associated applied research opportunities had 
developed.33 Norms were set during the War for the supplement of 
occasional government contract engagements to sustain the 
technological revolution—especially to remain competitive with the 
Soviet Union. Some institutions comfortable with an emphasis on 
application in science—most notably MIT, which for years had placed 
applied science at the center of its curriculum and had been deeply 
involved in the Radiation Laboratory34—embraced these and other 
opportunities to work directly with industry.35 
                                                          
 28. See James Stuart, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A Warning to Universities, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1032-35 (2004). 
 29. GEIGER, supra note 12, at 6. 
 30. The United States government has suggested and actually made claims to several 
pharmaceuticals post-development and market entry. A noted fairly contemporary example is the 
breast cancer drug Taxol. See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the 
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is there a Role for Compulsory 
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 153-54 (2007) (discussing how the 
federal government funded the development of Taxol, but granted the pharmaceutical company the 
right to sell the drug to the public). We see analogous behavior today when research institutions that 
receive federal funding apply the requisite Common Rule infrastructure—compliance with the 
regulations to protect human subjects that federal funding triggers—to their privately-funded basic 
research endeavors. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
BOARD (IRB) REFERENCE BOOK (Michele K. Russell-Einhorn & Thomas Puglisi eds., 2001) 
(providing an overview of federal regulations regarding the oversight of human subjects research).  
 31. Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work 
in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 241-42 (2004). 
 32. GEIGER, supra note 12, at 41. 
 33. Id. at 13. 
 34. See supra note 12.  
 35.  
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The 1950s ended with yet another major escalation in federal 
funding of science research—this time in response to the technological 
prowess of the Soviet Union. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union 
outpaced the United States in space technology by launching Sputnik 1, 
the first man-made object to orbit the earth.36 The United States 
increased its own government laboratory research in space science and 
beyond, and also introduced more programs to support university 
development, infrastructure, and graduate education.37 
However, the 1960s, which began with the Bay of Pigs Invasion 
and Cuban missile crisis and ended with the government’s own space 
science program placing a man on the moon, saw greater demand that 
federally-funded science produce tangible applications.38 The federal 
government grew impatient with academic research, and its funding of 
academic research diminished. “The annus horribilis, 1968, brought an 
end to the expansion of academic research and anguish over the role that 
universities had assumed.”39 This trend continued, making the 1970s a 
decade of stagnation in federal support for academic research: 
                                                          
The MIT Technology Licensing Office (TLO) was established in 1945, many years 
before most universities were encouraged to take similar steps by the Bayh-Dole Act. 
The TLO office plays a very proactive role in technology transfer activities. Rather than 
waiting for a technology pull, reacting to requests for licenses from interested 
companies, the TLO encouraged faculty to promptly disclose inventions, then quickly 
and carefully evaluate the market value of inventions, and obtain protection of 
intellectual property. It also meets with venture capitalists to discuss new technologies 
and ongoing research at the Institute that may be appropriate for a start-up venture. This 
approach began at MIT at a time when such an approach was viewed as ‘unseemly’ by 
some of MIT’s peer institutions.  
Rory P. O’Shea et al., Creating the Entrepreneurial University: The Case of MIT 12 (2005), 
available at www.umsystem.edu/ums/departments/ed/documents/EntrepreneurialUniversity 
MIT.pdf. In contrast, at other academic institutions establishment of policies and administrative 
procedures required for working within the Bayh-Dole regime took at least a decade following its 
enactment. 
 36. See Barton Beebe, Note, Law’s Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing the Future in 
the Early Corpus Juris Spatialis, 108 YALE L.J. 1737, 1744 (1999). To summarize: 
The immediate effect of the Sputnik Crisis in America was a call for total mobilization, 
for “blood, sweat and tears,” in pursuit of scientific and technological superiority. This 
call extended to the nation’s educational system, to its industrial base, to its commodity 
culture, and, of course, to its methods of governance. Ever prudent, Eisenhower refused 
to be carried away by the panic. In his 1958 State of the Union Address, he declared that 
the Soviet Union had begun to wage “total cold war,” but proposed only modest reforms. 
It was left to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, to the New Frontier and the 
Great Society, to wage total cold war in return.  
Id. at 1745 (footnotes omitted).  
 37. GEIGER, supra note 12, at xv. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
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For the next ten years universities endured stagnation in research 
support, the end of enrollment growth in higher education, a crash in 
the job market for new Ph.D.’s, intrusive government regulation, and 
fiscal distress. Universities largely reacted to student rebellion and 
public chastisement by withdrawing to the ivory tower. Higher 
education rhetoric and university actions disdained entanglements with 
the defense establishment or the corporate world, extolling instead the 
role of unsullied social critic. Egalitarianism and social justice 
informed the new zeitgeist as a powerful campus polity sought to enlist 
the university in such virtuous causes as racial and social gender 
equity, third world liberation, urban revitalization, and environmental 
preservation. . . . [B]y the late 1970s it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that there was too little research, academic or otherwise, 
reaching the productive economy.40 
C. The Era of Integration 
By the end of the 1970s, the decade-long bout with “stagflation” 
(coined at the time to capture the combination of a stagnant economy, a 
floundering stock market, and inflation) led to demand for more R&D 
and translation of the fruits of that R&D into economy-stimulating 
technology. In Congress, more than any other problem, the energy crisis, 
characterized by staggering oil prices and long lines at gas pumps, 
generated accusations that big business was not investing enough in 
research, and that the federal government, mired in bureaucracy, was 
allowing academic research funded by the government to remain locked 
in file cabinets.41 This latter criticism was well-founded. The lack of any 
uniform federal policies on patenting government-sponsored inventions 
or the transfer of technology from the government to the private sector 
left agencies to act case-by-case as they encountered instances of 
invention.42 This generated agency-specific inconsistencies, multiplied 
among the agencies with which individual universities and corporate 
entities had to deal. The result was uncertainty and tremendous 
administrative burdens for all involved.43 “At the time, fewer than 5 
                                                          
 40. Id. 
 41. See id., at xv-xvi; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 2-3 (1998) [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]; Chester G. Moore, Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 153-54 (2006). 
 42. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 3. 
 43. Id.; see also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to 
the Cost?, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2007) (“Naturally, that created undue bureaucracy as 
universities (and other contractors) and their funding agencies attempted to sort through ownership 
issues both ex ante, in the grant applications, and then again, ex post, once inventions were 
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percent of the 28,000 patents being held by federal agencies had been 
licensed, compared with 25 percent to 30 percent of the small number of 
federal patents for which the government had allowed companies to 
retain title to the invention.”44 
Congress responded in 1980 by passing legislation intended to 
promote economic development, enhance United States competitiveness, 
and benefit the public through commercialization of government-funded 
research—the Bayh-Dole Act45 and the Stevenson-Wydler Act.46 The 
legislative intent of Bayh-Dole was, through reform of patent policy 
related to government-sponsored research: (1) to enable and encourage 
“universities, not-for-profit corporations, and small businesses to patent 
and commercialize their federally-funded inventions and (2) to allow 
federal agencies to grant exclusive licenses for their technology to 
provide more incentive to businesses.”47 
                                                          
created.”); Stuart, supra note 28, at 1034-35 (“However, under the pre-1980 regime, the government 
retained intellectual property rights to such research; thus, a firm would have to go through the 
unwieldy process of trying to license inventions from the federal government. . . . [T]he Act was 
aimed at corporate underwriters who, because of these newly added layers of legal protection, 
would be encouraged to underwrite university research so as to turn inventions into marketable 
products.”). 
 44. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 3; see also Stuart, supra note 28, at 1034 (“Whereas the 
major principle in the decades after World War II was that technology owned by the government 
was for ‘everyone’s benefit,’ supporters of the Act claimed that this policy effectively rendered 
government-owned technology for ‘nobody’s benefit.’ It simply gathered dust in government 
repositories.”). 
 45. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 
94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)); see also COUNCIL ON 
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
(1996), available at http://206.151.87.67/docs/bayhdoleqa.htm (providing background information 
on the Bayh-Dole Act).  
 46. Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3715 (2006). 
 47. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 3; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH, NIH RESPONSE TO THE CONFERENCE REPORT REQUEST FOR A PLAN TO ENSURE 
TAXPAYERS’ INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED (2001) [hereinafter NIH REPORT], available at 
http://www.nih.gov/news.070101wyden.htm; see also Matthew Herder, Asking for Money Back—
Chilling Commercialization or Recouping Public Trust in the Context of Stem Cell Research?, 9 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 203, 207-12 (2008) (providing a detailed discussion of the proposed 
recoupment provisions and associated testimony); Moore, supra note 41, at 153-54. As explained by 
the NIH, the collective goal of these acts “is to promote economic development, enhance U.S. 
competitiveness, and benefit the public by encouraging the commercialization of technologies that 
would otherwise not be developed into products due to lack of incentives.” NIH REPORT, supra. 
Later, Congress added to these Acts with enactment of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
1986 (“FTTA”), which authorizes federal agencies to enter into cooperative research and 
development agreements (“CRADA”) with non-federal partners to conduct research. See Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710a-3710d (2006). In 1987, federal regulations 
were issued by the Department of Commerce, codified at 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2008), to fully 
implement the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-4 (providing a 
clear summary of the requirements set forth in these regulations).  
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Originally, Bayh-Dole did not apply to large firms, its benefits 
being limited to “any contractor who is a non-profit research institution 
or a small business.”48 This concession was to balance the lack of a 
recoupment provision49 and the Act’s grant of title to the grantee with 
the United States holding only a license.50 Although those seeking a 
recoupment provision pressed hard, ultimately the day was carried by 
their opponents who argued that any amount collected by recoupment 
might be outweighed by the administrative costs51 and would certainly 
be dwarfed by the indirect returns from funding scientific research.52 The 
                                                          
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 5 (1980). 
 49. See Herder, supra note 47, at 207-12 (detailing the discussion of the proposed recoupment 
provisions and associated testimony). Many in Congress were apprehensive about giving away 
inventions made with taxpayer investments.  
Until shortly before its passage, the Bayh-Dole Act contained language to recoup the 
federal investment for federally funded technologies that reach commercialization. The 
proposed language included a formula for the repayment process. The Government 
would receive 15 percent of income over $70,000 gross income after a patent application 
was filed and up to an additional 5 percent if the gross income exceeded $1 million, up 
to the amount of government contributions under the funding agreement, pegged to the 
Consumer Price Index. 
NIH REPORT, supra note 47. 
 50.  
Throughout, there remained tension over the question of whether the government should 
own resulting inventions, or merely have a right to use them. This title-versus-license 
debate was ultimately resolved by the Bayh-Dole Act in favor of the latter system, 
whereby the contractor may elect ownership, but the government obtains an automatic, 
fully paid-up grant-back on federally funded inventions. 
de Larena, supra note 43, at 1379 (footnote omitted).  
 51. NIH REPORT, supra note 47. 
 52. See id.; see also Herder, supra note 47, at 214. Opponents of the recoupment provision 
argued that an increase in federal, state, and local tax bases from resulting commercial activity and 
jobs would far exceed taxpayer investment, and this position was supported by the United States 
Congressional Joint Economic Committee. NIH REPORT, supra note 47. According to the 
Congressional Economic Joint Committee:  
The benefit of increased life expectancy in the U.S. as a result of advances in health care 
creates annual net gains of about $2.4 trillion (using 1992 dollars). . . . “[I]f only 10 
percent of these increases in value ($240 billion) are the result of NIH-funded medical 
research, it indicates a payoff of about 15 times the taxpayers’ annual NIH investment of 
$16 billion.” 
Id. (quoting JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., U.S. SENATE, THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH AND 
THE ROLE OF THE NIH 17 (2000)). Also, a commissioned study concluded that:  
The total economic value to Americans of reductions in mortality from cardiovascular 
disease averaged $1.5 trillion annually in the 1970-1990 period. So if just one-third of 
the gain came from medical research, the return on the investment averaged $500 billion 
a year. That’s on the order of 20 times as large as average annual spending on medical 
research—by any benchmark an astonishing return for the investment.  
LASKER/FUNDING FIRST, MARY WOODWARD LASKER CHARITABLE TRUST, EXCEPTIONAL 
RETURNS: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF AMERICA’S INVESTMENT IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 8 (2000), 
http://www.laskerfoundation.org/advocacy/pdf/exceptional.pdf.  
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issue has been addressed and the same conclusion reached globally.53 As 
explained by the NIH in its 2001 report on technology transfer: 
To obtain passage of the [Bayh-Dole Act], members of Congress 
agreed that recoupment provisions would be dropped. However, due to 
concerns of some members of Congress that large companies would 
benefit from public dollars without a return to the taxpayer, large 
companies were removed from eligibility in the final bill. With these 
changes, the bill was passed and the Act today remains applicable to 
universities, nonprofit organizations and small businesses. In 1983, by 
Presidential Memorandum, President Ronald Reagan extended the 
implementation to large companies. And, in 1987, implementation of 
the Act was extended to these companies as part of an Executive Order 
issued by President Reagan.54 
The new dispensation of the Bayh-Dole Act did not come free of all 
limitations, but these are not very onerous, particularly as the Act has 
been put into practice over the three decades since its passage. Chiefly 
the limitations require that the funded invention be responsibly protected 
and pursued. They state a preference for American industry in any 
relevant products to be made or sold in the United States.55 Grant 
recipients must report promptly all inventions to the funding agency. 
Grantees must also timely elect whether to seek patents on the 
inventions and, if they decline or fail to do so, the funding agency may 
take title to them.56 Whether or not the funding agency takes title to the 
invention or the patent, the United States is given the right to practice 
the invention, worldwide and at no charge, for its own use.57 
                                                          
 53.  
Countries around the globe attempting to emulate Bayh-Dole have, whether by design or 
default, reinforced the underlying logic against recoupment, which is essentially as 
follows: obligations to provide direct financial returns undermine the commercialization 
process and therefore threaten what the public cares about most, i.e. the production of 
new goods. 
Herder, supra note 47, at 203. 
 54. NIH REPORT, supra note 47. 
 55. The accompanying burdens and obligations are found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & 
Supp. V 2006) and the implementing regulations are at 37 C.F.R. § 401.1-1.17 (2008).  
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1)-(2); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)-(d). If the contractor elects to seek 
patents, it must do so timely and, if it declines or fails to do so, the funding agency can take title to 
them. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d)(1). The contractor’s ongoing efforts to achieve 
practical application of the invention are not ignored. It must report annually to the funding agency 
on the invention’s utilization. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(h). The content of that report should include 
“information regarding the status of development, date of first commercial sale or use, gross 
royalties received by the contractor, and such other data and information as the agency may 
reasonably specify.” Id. However, the agency is urged to accept the information, to the extent 
feasible, in the contractor’s usual internal format. 37 C.F.R. § 401.8(a). 
 57. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b). 
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Finally, and importantly, Bayh-Dole provides the government with 
a “trump card,” the march-in right. Insofar as the grantee fails to achieve 
practical application of the invention and make its benefits reasonably 
accessible to the public, the funding agency may march in on the 
patented invention and license it to others.58 Because the march-in right 
is so powerful and could exert an in terrorem effect on grantees and 
those with whom they hope to work to develop inventions arising from 
funded research, the Bayh-Dole Act regulations hedge the exercise of 
any march-in right with due process protections to the grantee.59 And the 
actual practice of funding agencies under the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in 
provisions is consistent with the regulatory intent not to disturb the 
settled expectations of grantees and their commercial counterparties.60 
                                                          
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 59. For a description of these due process protections, see 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b)-(j); see also 
Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem 
Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1138, 1143, 1155-59 (2006) (describing the march-in 
rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and noting that the process is so cumbersome that, to date, they 
have not been exercised by the government). For instance, if the funding agency receives 
information that might warrant exercise of the march-in right, it must give the contractor written and 
specific notice, and afford the contractor the chance to respond with comments and relevant 
information. At this informal stage, the agency may drop the matter and, if so, it must timely notify 
the contractor. If the agency decides to proceed, it must initiate a formal proceeding, which is 
replete with safeguards against error, bias, or caprice. The contractor may submit evidence and if 
the evidence raises a genuine dispute over material facts, the agency must undertake the necessary 
fact-finding. The contractor may appear with counsel and submit documentary evidence, present 
witnesses, and confront such witnesses as the agency may present. The contractor has the right to a 
written transcript of the proceeding and official written findings of fact and may submit written 
argument and make oral arguments. The head of the agency is responsible for making a final written 
determination, and this must be sent to the contractor by certified or registered mail within ninety 
days of the completion of fact-finding or oral argument. If the agency reaches a determination 
adverse to the contractor, the result is held in abeyance pending final resolution in the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, to which anyone adversely affected by the march-in determination may 
petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(b); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6. This abeyance applies unless there is a public 
health emergency under 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) or the contractor has failed to honor the substantial 
United States manufacture requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4).  
 60. In the twenty-eight years since the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted, there have been three 
occasions when a funding agency (in each case, the NIH) was petitioned to exercise its march-in 
powers against a grantee. The first of these was the petition by CellPro, Inc. against patents on stem 
cell purification and suspension technology, which were held by Johns Hopkins University and 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Office of the Dir., Determination in the Case 
of Petition of CellPro, Inc. (Aug. 1, 1997), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nih-
01.htm. The second and third petitions were companion petitions directed against Abbott 
Corporation’s Norvir and Pharmacia Corporation’s Xalatan drugs. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Office of 
the Dir., In the Case of Norvir (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-in-
norvir.pdf; Nat’l Inst. of Health, Office of the Dir., In the Case of Xalatan (Sept. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-in-xalatan.pdf. The NIH has not chosen to 
exercise the march-in power in any of these three petitions. This lack of action has not pleased 
some, who argue that patented products cannot be said to have been “reduced to practical 
application” as Bayh-Dole requires, if they are available to the public at a price that is too expensive 
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Federal technology transfer law and policy has had a profound 
impact on academia, industry, biomedical R&D, the American economy, 
and, potentially, the future of human health.61 As it sought to do, the 
“give away” of federally-funded invention “unlocked all the inventions 
and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout the United 
States with the help of taxpayers’ money.”62 The immediate impact was 
to integrate different parts of the R&D community.63 “A fruitful 
collaboration between academic researchers and industry promised to 
fuel not only economic development but also new sources of revenue for 
universities. A vast movement of privatization was underway by the 
mid-1980s, and it reinvigorated research universities.”64 Since the 1990s, 
this integration of academia and industry has proceeded in an explosive 
manner, giving rise to all the benefits, concerns, and controversies that 
accompany such dramatic and rapid change.65 Arguably, this integration 
                                                          
(although any price above zero will be open to this criticism). See, e.g., Statement of James Love, 
President of Essential Inventions Inc., NIH Meeting on Norvir/Ritonavir March-In Request (May 
25, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/James-Love-Pres-Essential-
Inventions-Inc.pdf. Thus, there is pressure to amend the Bayh-Dole Act to make march-in less 
“cumbersome,” and that pressure has come to bear on the California system, as discussed infra at 
Part IV.C. See Mireles, supra note 59, at 1155 (stating that Bayh-Dole march-in is “encumbered by 
a complex set of regulations, including provisions allowing for appeal of any decision to exercise 
such rights, and could serve as a disincentive to use those rights”). 
 61. The GAO evaluated the impact of technology transfer in a report issued in 1998 and the 
NIH did the same in 2001. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 41; NIH REPORT, supra note 47. 
Reports also have been done by consulting groups such as the Boston Consulting Group, and on the 
national and state levels. See generally PETER GOLDSBROUGH ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY INTO ITS SECOND CENTURY: FROM SERENDIPITY TO STRATEGY 
(1999); Biotechnology Industries Organization, www.bio.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (follow 
“State by State Initiatives” hyperlink). See also generally Michael J. Malinowski & Radhika Rao, 
Legal Limitations on Genetic Research and the Commercialization of Its Results, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 45 (2006) (noting the progress of biopharmaceuticals). 
 62. Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 3. 
 63. Id.  
 64. GEIGER, supra note 12, at xvi. 
 65. As stated by one observer, “It has turned universities into commercial entities, created a 
multibillion-dollar industry of technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every biotechnology 
company and discovery of the past twenty-five years.” de Larena, supra note 43, at 1375. For 
another evaluation of the Bayh-Dole Act, see generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER 
AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004). For thoughtful discussion of what 
major medical centers should consider before entering into alliances with industry, see Hamilton 
Moses, III, et al., Industrial Collaboration, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863, 864 (2003). Perhaps the 
major point of controversy is the assertion that federal technology transfer law and policy has 
resulted in frantic patenting in biotechnology, creating a thicket of patents and administrative 
burden in licensing that threatens to shut down the field. Professors Rebecca Eisenberg, Arti Rai, 
and others have centered their careers on this argument. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. 
Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1197 (2006); 
see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
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was a categorical imperative: In some fields, particularly life science, 
neither universities nor industry could reach and remain at the leading 
edge of scientific research and product development, respectively, 
without engaging with each other. The rapid pace of the science, and its 
complexity, meant that any given research project depended on many 
different tools and skill sets, on many scales and schedules; and many of 
these were constantly being superseded or expanded. No single 
participant or R&D sector could afford to develop and maintain all of 
these complementary technologies without help from other participants 
both within and outside its particular sector. In some cases, this 
collaboration was personified by individuals moving between academia 
and industry and acting as agents for both simultaneously.66 Remaining 
at the forefront of technology is innate to universities’ combined 
missions of teaching, research, and service: “By no means is all new 
knowledge discovered in universities, but most of it soon finds it way 
there. Universities serve as the warehouse and distribution center for the 
most advanced and theoretical forms of knowledge.”67 
In particular, “[b]iotechnology manifested its commercial potential 
in unmistakable fashion. Pure biological research had yielded the tools 
to transform life itself, with enormous implications for medicine and 
agriculture.”68 An entire domestic-based sector, today well over 1000 
companies,69 has unfolded in about the time it takes to develop one 
innovative new biopharmaceutical.70 The global pharmaceutical sector 
                                                          
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998). Certainly, the rocketed 
acceleration of the state of the art in biotech fueled by the unprecedented progression of the 
underlying science leaves us with many patents issued early in the genomics revolution that would 
not sustain reexamination, and this has driven those in the field to an obsessive-compulsive drive to 
patent. Perhaps the United States Patent and Trademark Office should exercise the mechanism of 
reexamination and clear much of this perceived thicket. See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE 
J. ON REG. 163, 233 (1996). Nevertheless, to date, biotech R&D is unique in its tendency to inspire 
competitors to collaborate, and, in general, those engaged in biopharmaceutical R&D have 
demonstrated a strong predisposition to license over patent conflicts and to conservatism and 
judgment in the enforcement of issued patents. This collaborative effect is the shared practice and 
field experience of the authors. 
 66. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 65, at 166.  
 67. GEIGER, supra note 12, at xvii.  
 68. Id. at xvi; see also Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 26, at 1400.  
 69. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/BiotechGuide.pdf (providing data as of 2005).  
 70. Industry estimates, based on largely proprietary data, provided by industry voluntarily and 
processed by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development (a center sponsored by the 
industry), are ten to fifteen years at $800 million for one innovative new drug. Id. at 42. However, 
“technological advances have lowered the cost of sequencing at a fairly constant rate, halving it 
approximately every 22 months.” Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 26, at 1400. Thus, it is likely 
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and biotechnology sectors have become part of a continuum,71 with 
biopharmaceuticals replacing pharmaceuticals in development.72 The 
United States has experienced a tremendous biopharmaceutical R&D 
influx, making it the concentrated epicenter of the global endeavor to 
translate the map of the human genome into medical utility and, more 
generally, to realize the human health and other application benefits of 
contemporary biotechnology.73 
III. THIRTY YEARS OF STEM CELL DEBATE 
Legislation and regulation of stem cell research and medicine 
operates at multiple levels of government and along two fundamental 
dimensions. In the United States, these multiple levels include federal, 
state, and local. Of the two fundamental dimensions, the first speaks 
normatively to that which may be absolutely prohibited, permitted, or 
mandated by statute or regulation; and the second, to that which the 
government may or may not be willing to fund.74 Within the normative 
dimension, assuming at least some form of human stem cell research or 
medicine is permitted, various sub-dimensions arise relating to matters 
                                                          
that the development of new technologies will continue to “accelerate this rapid decrease in 
sequencing costs.” Id.  
 71. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., supra note 69, at 2, 6-15; PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. 
OF AM., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/files/2007%20Annual%20Report.pdf (“The pharmaceutical industry is one 
of the most R&D intensive businesses in the United States. Last year, America’s pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies invested $55.2 billion in biopharmaceutical research.”). For example, 
Global Research and Development at Pfizer, Inc. funds a Biotherapeutics and Bioinnovation Center 
based in the San Francisco Bay area that combines “cutting-edge biology, new platform 
technologies, and advanced research tools to discover and develop new medicines” and has been 
mandated to “collaborate broadly with the academic, biotech, and venture communities to focus on 
discovering and developing new medicines.” See WorldPharmaNews.com, Pfizer Launches 
Independent Biotherapeutics and Bioinnovation Center, Oct. 5, 2007, 
http://www.worldpharmanews.com/content/view/147/30. 
 72. For the purpose of this discussion a “small molecule compound” is comprised of a few 
dozen atoms, typically carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and some others, produced through 
chemical synthesis or purified from substances found in nature. A “biologic” is typically a larger 
molecule or complex of molecules, such as a protein or an antibody, and is usually produced by 
bacteria or yeast through the process of fermentation and then purified. See BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUS. ORG., supra note 69, at 42.  
 73. A 2004 report issued by the Milken Institute predicted that by 2014 the biopharmaceutical 
industry’s impact on the United States would mean over 3.6 million jobs and $350.1 billion in real 
output. MILKEN INST., BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO STATE AND U.S. 
ECONOMICS 158-59 (2004), available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications 
/publications.taf?function=detail&ID=377&cat=ResRep. 
 74. See generally LOUIS M. GUENIN, THE MORALITY OF STEM CELL USE (2008); RUSSELL 
KOROBKIN & STEPHEN R. MUNZER, STEM CELL CENTURY 26-91 (2007) (providing a systematic 
exploration of this range of issues).  
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such as informed consent,75 payments and reimbursements to subjects 
and participants in such research,76 and the use and commercialization of 
the various instruments, reagents, tissue samples, cell lines, and cells 
through which research, medicine, or both are undertaken.77 
Within each of these dimensions, the national debates took a 
separate course, but they arose long before hESCs were even available. 
The debate within the funding dimension arose in the late 1970s in the 
context of the NIH’s consideration of whether and how it would support 
research in embryology, including in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). IVF is 
related to hESC research by virtue of the fact that pre-implantation 
embryos created in IVF clinics for treating fertility problems but not 
used for implantation—referred to as “excess preimplantation 
embryos”—are a source of hESCs,78 and several cell-handling 
techniques in IVF are also employed in somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(“SCNT”) technology.79 
                                                          
 75. An important element of all legislative and regulatory rules and guidelines for the use of 
excess human embryos to create pluripotent stem cell lines has been the informed consent of the 
donors of those embryos. For several years, commentators have expressed concerns about the 
adequacy of informed consent used for existing pluripotent stem cell lines derived from excess 
human embryos. See, e.g., Timothy Caulfield et al., Informed Consent in Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research: Are We Following Basic Principles?, 176 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1722, 1724 (2007); see 
also Rosario M. Isasi & Bartha M. Knoppers, Beyond the Permissibility of Embryonic and Stem 
Cell Research: Substantive Requirements and Procedural Safeguards, 21 HUM. REPROD. 2474, 
2478 (2006). The informed consent issue has captured increasing attention with some controversy 
as to whether certain pluripotent stem cell lines derived from excess human embryos prior to August 
9, 2001, were derived with adequate informed consent. See, e.g., Monya Baker, Consent Issues 
Restrict Stem-Cell Use, 454 NATURE 556, 556 (2008); Robert Streiffer, Informed Consent and 
Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 2008, at 40, 42-43.  
 76. For a list of state laws relating to payment and reimbursements for donation of eggs, 
zygotes, embryos, and fetal tissue, see Nat’l Conference of State Legislature, supra note 8. 
 77. For an explanation of the application of human subject protection rules to cancer 
treatment clinical trials, including stem cell transplant, see generally INST. OF MED., A REPORT ON 
THE SPONSORS OF CANCER TREATMENT CLINICAL TRIALS AND THEIR APPROVAL AND MONITORING 
MECHANISMS (1999). For an example of the impact of federal funding policies on stem cell research 
facilities at American universities, see Stanford Report, 5 Questions: Longaker on Stem Cell 
Research (Apr. 6, 2005), http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/april6/med-longtaker-
040605.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (describing how state funding for the purpose of creating 
new stem cell lines must first be used to build separate facilities so that no federal funding is 
inadvertently spent on such research).  
 78. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNDERSTANDING STEM CELLS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
SCIENCE AND ISSUES FROM THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 5-6, available at 
http://dels.nas.edu/bls/stemcells/what-is-a-stem-cell.shtml. Because of the stochastic nature of IVF, 
multiple eggs are fertilized during the IVF procedure. Those fertilized eggs that are not implanted in 
the mother are referred to as “excess” embryos and are stored under cryogenic conditions. Id. at 5.  
 79. In SCNT, the nucleus of an egg cell from an organism of a particular species is replaced 
with the nucleus from an adult body cell, or somatic cell, taken from an organism of that or another 
species. This procedure came to be referred to as “cloning” and has historically been viewed as an 
important research tool within the fields of embryology and developmental biology. Id. at 7. 
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In contrast, within the normative dimension, the debate began to 
boil in the 1990s over the issue of creating human pluripotent stem cell 
lines.80 These cell lines could be produced from (a) excess 
preimplantation embryos; as well as from (b) “research embryos” 
produced by fertilizing donated human eggs (called “oocytes”) with 
donated human sperm specifically for research purposes outside the 
context of IVF-based fertility treatment; and (c) SCNT-produced 
blastocysts.81 As the debate first arose, a distinction existed between 
research embryos produced and SCNT-produced blastocysts, but this 
distinction blurred after August 9, 2001, when the White House issued a 
fact sheet on hESC research (the “2001 Fact Sheet”).82 In the wake of 
the NIH’s implementation of the policy set forth in the 2001 Fact Sheet, 
the debate grew confused and important distinctions were suppressed 
between and among terms and phrases such as “human embryonic stem 
cells,” “somatic cell nuclear transfer,” “human cloning,” “human cloning 
for reproductive purposes”, and “human cloning for research 
purposes.”83 As noted, elements of the normative debate were 
combined,84 and that combined debate conflated with the funding debate. 
The conflated normative and funding debate spread from the federal 
arena to the states, and the confusion and controversy has continued 
unabated at both the federal and state levels. By combining and merging 
these technological concepts and debates, important distinctions may 
have been lost, or perhaps never achieved. Without clear distinctions, 
honest and constructive debate—even if impossible to resolve—cannot 
be accomplished. 
                                                          
 80. Pluripotent stem cells are found in the interior of a blastocyst and are referred to as such 
“because they can differentiate into all of the cell types of the body.” Id. at 4.  
A blastocyst . . . is a pre-implantation embryo that develops 5 days after the fertilization 
of an egg by a sperm. It contains all the material necessary for the development of a 
complete human being . . . . In its interior is the inner cell mass, which is composed of 
30-34 [pluripotent] cells. . . . In common usage, ‘embryo’ can refer to all stages of 
development from fertilization until a somewhat ill-defined stage when it is called a 
fetus.  
Id.  
 81. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Clinton Asks Study of Bid to Form Part-Human, Part-Cow 
Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at L31.  
 82. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
(Aug. 9, 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). 
 83. Id; see also Richard Pérez-Peña, Broad Movement Is Backing Embryo Stem Cell 
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at N20. 
 84. Richard Pérez-Peña, supra note 83, at 20 (“In the last year, the stem cell debate has 
merged with the one over human cloning.”).  
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A. The Funding Dimension at the United States Federal Level 
1. The 1970s 
Touching a complex issue on which the American public is deeply 
divided, the Supreme Court’s 1973 holding in Roe v. Wade85 marked 
neither the beginning nor the end of the debate on early termination of 
pregnancy; rather, the Court’s holding fueled the controversy.86 
Responding to the policy issues presented in Roe, together with concerns 
over the protection of human subjects in government-funded research, 
Congress in 1974 established the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(“Commission”).87 One of the Commission’s missions88 was “to 
investigate and study research involving the living fetus, and to 
recommend whether and under what circumstances such research should 
be conducted or supported by the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare.”89 
In 1975, the Commission concluded, among other things, “that 
some information which is in the public interest and which provides 
significant advances in health care can be attained only through the use 
                                                          
 85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 86. See generally EVE HEROLD, STEM CELL WARS (2006) (discussing connections between 
the stem cell debate and the debate about elected early termination of human pregnancy); see also 
Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
101, 161-62 (2003) (Discussing the “larger history of ideas” spanning centuries as the continuing 
source of fuel for this particular debate: “[T]he most important questions arising within the debate 
about embryonic research and therapeutic cloning (and more widely about genetic information and 
its uses) concern the character of the individual person in a universe with the capacity to prolong life 
long beyond current expectations, to alter people’s minds and bodies—and perhaps their souls—
through technology, and to select physical and affective traits prenatally. . . . Both the debate about 
abortion and that about embryonic research are also debates about social transition. The future is 
murky, but these conflated debates provide the analyst with a view of society contemplating itself 
and its most deeply held convictions.”). 
 87. See National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, 348 (1974); see also NAT’L 
COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS 1 (1975) [hereinafter 
NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION], available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports 
/past_commissions/research_fetus.pdf. 
 88. A primary mission for the Commission was to address how it was possible for the United 
States government to have funded for decades the infamous Tuskegee Study, a study of black men 
suffering from syphilis in which the men were not given standard antibiotic therapy. See, e.g., Ctrs. 
for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 89. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION, supra note 87, at 1 (indicating Congress’s 
concern, among others, “that unconscionable acts involving the fetus may have been performed in 
the name of scientific inquiry, with only proxy consent on behalf of the fetus”); see also Marjorie 
Sun, Another Threat to Fetal Research, 218 SCIENCE 981, 981 (1982) (noting that as early as 1973, 
the NIH had instituted rules relating to research with human fetuses).  
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of the human fetus as a research subject.”90 The task for drawing 
regulations consistent with the ethical principles required for conducting 
and funding research on the human fetus fell to the Ethics Advisory 
Board (“EAB”) of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(“HEW”).91 The demise of this powerful board in September 1980, two 
months prior to the presidential election of that year, may be a root cause 
of the stymied progress in stem cell research to the present day.92 
Following the July 1978 report from England of the first human 
birth using IVF,93 the EAB took up the attendant scientific, ethical, legal, 
and social issues, and, in May 1979, reported that IVF research was 
“‘ethically acceptable’” and could be supported with federal funds.94 
Under 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d), the EAB would be responsible for 
reviewing IVF and related embryologic and fetal research to be 
conducted or funded by the NIH. But, as at least one source explains, the 
then Secretary of HEW, Patricia Harris, viewed infertility as a problem 
suffered by the middle and upper classes and not one to be studied with 
HEW funds.95 And as other sources indicate, Secretary Harris was also 
influenced by letters from the public strongly opposed to federal funding 
of embryologic and fetal research.96 Consequently, Secretary Harris 
allowed the EAB charter to lapse, without renewal, in September 1980.97 
This decision resulted in a “‘de facto moratorium’” on any funding for 
                                                          
 90. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION, supra note 87, at 62.  
 91. See STEPHEN S. HALL, MERCHANTS OF IMMORTALITY: CHASING THE DREAM OF HUMAN 
LIFE EXTENSION 100 (2003).  
 92. From 1974 to 1978, the EAB issued several reports that formed the basis of the federal 
regulations set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2007), a four-part set of regulations, with each part aimed at 
protecting a specific population of subjects in specified areas of research conducted, supported or 
otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency. Part B focused on research 
involving pregnant women, human fetuses, neonates of uncertain viability, and nonviable neonates. 
Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Woman Gives Birth to Baby Conceived Outside the Body, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
1978, at A1. 
 94. Ethics Advisory Board: In Vitro Fertilization is ‘Ethically Acceptable,’ IRB, Apr. 1979, at 
7, 7.  
 95. HALL, supra note 91, at 100-01 (“‘[Harris] said infertility was a middle-class and upper-
class problem,’ [according to former NIH bioethicist John C. Fletcher]. . . . ‘The official view was, 
and probably still is, that infertility wasn’t a disease.’ Harris refused to approve . . . IVF research in 
general. Then, when the EAB’s charter lapsed, ‘it was summarily disbanded’ by Harris in 
September 1980, according to former EAB member Albert Jonsen, who [stated], . . . ‘The Ethics 
Advisory Board still hovers as a ghostly presence in the Federal Regulations, charged with 
mandatory review of certain types of research, but it exists nowhere in reality.’”). 
 96. See Richard Doerflinger, A New Assault on the Smallest Humans?, U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Aug. 5, 1988, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/ivf/lif8588.shtml (“HEW 
Secretary Patricia Harris nevertheless decided not to fund the research, in part because she received 
thousands of letters against it from citizens concerned about the risks to the human embryo.”). 
 97. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HUMAN CLONING 4 (2001), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS21096.pdf.  
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IVF and embryology research.98 This breakdown in the administrative 
process, coupled with “political winds [growing] chillier still for 
government-financed research after the 1980 election,”99 led to an 
exodus from the NIH of the expert embryologists and fetal development 
scientists who had assembled there to advance their fields.100 
2. Revitalization of the NIH 
Shortly after taking office in 1993, President Clinton selected 
Nobel Laureate Harold Varmus as the new NIH director.101 Determined 
to revitalize the NIH’s study of human fetal tissue and stem cell biology 
as important potential sources of new therapies, Dr. Varmus saw to it 
that the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 
(“NIHRA”) included provisions conducive for that research—principally 
among these, a single sentence that abolished the requirement that IVF 
research proposals be reviewed by the EAB (an entity that had then been 
dead for thirteen years).102 Replacing that review process would be one 
that required the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to 
apply the same risk standard in assessing research proposals for fetuses. 
                                                          
 98. Id.  
 99. HALL, supra note 91, at 101.  
 100. See, e.g., Scientist Quits NIH Over Fetal Rules, 223 SCIENCE 916, 916 (1984) (“The 
absence of an ethics advisory board is ‘frustrating some of our scientists who can’t work on very 
important problems,’ says Mortimer Lipsett, director of the Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development. . . . Oddly enough, although antiabortion groups have been the strongest critics of in 
vitro fertilization, many of the scientific problems Lipsett alludes to can be construed as ‘pro-life’ 
because they are aimed at improving an embryo’s chances for survival.”). The requirements for 
EAB approval of research with embryos also applied to research with fetuses. While embryology 
and human fetal tissue research at the NIH may have been quick to deteriorate during the 1980s, by 
the turn of the 1980s into the early 1990s, several other areas of research at the NIH were also 
suffering. See, e.g., David Korn et al., The NIH Budget in the “Postdoubling” Era, 296 SCIENCE 
1401, 1401 (2002) (“In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the federal budget deficit, a recession, and 
administrative changes within the NIH caused oscillations in funding. . . . The net effect was to 
destabilize established research teams, to create uncertainty in young people contemplating research 
careers, to stimulate investigators to slice research projects into smaller grant proposals, and to shift 
a larger share of funded research costs onto awardee institutions.”). 
 101. Barbara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal, 
Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 
232 & n.8 (1994).  
 102. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, § 121(c), 
107 Stat. 122, 133 (1993) (nullifying 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (2007) (requiring EAB review of IVF 
proposals) and overturning Exec. Order No. 12,806, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,589 (May 21, 1992)). The 
overturned Executive Order by President George H. Bush established a fetal tissue bank “to provide 
a source of human tissue to develop treatments and research methods for various diseases . . . . The 
fetal tissue in the bank [was to] to be obtained exclusively from ectopic pregnancies and 
spontaneous abortions.” Exec. Order No. 12,806, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,589. The Order also directed the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to “develop human fetal cell lines in a manner consistent 
with current policy” and to ensure that the activities directed under the Order were “carried out in 
accordance with all other applicable legal requirements related to fetal tissue.” Id.  
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The policy underlying this approach was to protect unsuspecting women 
and their fetuses from unethical manipulation.103 
Serving this same objective, in September 1994, the NIH’s Human 
Embryo Research Panel reported its conclusion that federal funds should 
be provided for research that would use excess preimplantation embryos, 
and that, because studies requiring fertilization of oocytes were “needed 
to answer crucial questions in reproductive medicine,” it “would 
therefore not be wise to prohibit altogether the fertilization and study of 
oocytes for research purposes.”104 The Panel stressed, however, that all 
such research should be done in accordance with careful regulation and 
consistent monitoring entailed by moral respect for the qualities 
possessed by preimplantation embryos.105 These conclusions were 
unanimously accepted by the Advisory Committee to the Director of 
NIH, but not by President Clinton, who, in a December 2, 1994 
statement specifically rejected federal funding for creating embryos for 
research.106 The NIH thus proceeded to develop guidelines to support 
research using excess preimplantation embryos, with overall public 
consensus still far away. 
3. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment 
The enthusiasm for increased NIH funding exhibited by the 104th 
Congress—the “Contract with America” Congress elected in 1994—did 
not extend to SCNT with human cells and hESC research.107 Several 
representatives in Congress were particularly concerned that the 
December 2, 1994 presidential directive had only opposed the use of 
federal funds to create human embryos for research purposes and not, as 
well, the use of excess preimplantation human embryos for creating 
pluripotent cell lines. This concern led to the adoption of the “Dickey-
Wicker Amendment” (also referred to as the “Dickey Amendment”), a 
                                                          
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b) (2000). The regulations that ensue from the authority in 42 
U.S.C. § 289g(b) are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46.205(b)(1)(ii) (2007), which states that: (a) No fetus 
in utero may be involved as a subject in any activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) The purpose 
of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk 
only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the 
research is minimal and the purpose of the activity is the “development of important biomedical 
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.” Id.  
 104. AD HOC GROUP OF CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., NAT’L INST. 
OF HEALTH, 1 REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, xi-xii (1994).  
 105. Id. at x.  
 106. President William J. Clinton, Statement on Federal Funding of Research on Human 
Embryos, (Dec. 2, 1994), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php 
?pid=49545&st=embryo&st1=. 
 107. Phillip B.C. Jones, Funding of Human Stem Cell Research by the United States, 3 
ELECTRONIC J. BIOTECHNOLOGY 30, 31 (2000).  
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short two-sentence rider of less than 120 words attached to the federal 
appropriations act for fiscal year 1996.108 
The Amendment’s first sentence barred the use of any fiscal 1996 
federal appropriations for  
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; 
or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, 
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater 
than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 [C.F.R. 
§] 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. [§] 289g(b).109 
The Amendment’s second sentence defined “‘human embryo or 
embryos’” to “include any organism, not protected as a human subject 
under 45 [C.F.R. §] 46 as of the date of enactment of this Act, that is 
derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means 
from one or more human gametes.”110 The word “organism” here was 
not specifically defined, an omission of significance, as discussed below, 
for the proponents of research with hESCs. 
With the references to 45 C.F.R. § 46 and 42 U.S.C. § 289(g), two 
conclusions could be unmistakably drawn from the Dickey Amendment: 
first, Congress was according the same type of protection to human 
embryos, as defined therein, as that accorded to fetuses—in fact, fetuses 
in utero intended to be carried to term; and second, by extending to not 
only all of the then known procedures by which human embryos could 
potentially be created, but also to “any other means from one or more 
human gametes,” Congress was aiming broadly at present and future 
embryonic stem cell research techniques, well beyond the scope of the 
December 2, 1994 presidential directive.111 
                                                          
 108. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).  
 109. Id. Clause (1) of the Dickey Amendment statutorily codified the December 2, 1994 
presidential directive that federal funds could not be used for in vitro creation of embryos for 
research. Clause (2) went beyond the December 2, 1994 presidential directive by statutorily 
prohibiting federally-funded research with excess IVF embryos. Id. 
 110. Id. Later enactments of the Dickey Amendment added terms to this definition. See, e.g., 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. 106-554, § 510, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-71 (2000) 
(defining “‘human embryo or embryos’” to include “any organism, not protected as a human subject 
under 45 [C.F.R. §] 46 as of the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, 
parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes or human diploid 
cells”). 
 111. See generally Gerald D. Fischbach & Ruth L. Fischbach, Stem Cells: Science, Policy, and 
Ethics, 114 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1364, 1367 (2004) (“The Dickey Amendment includes 
‘research in which a human embryo is destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury 
or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero.’ Thus, preimplantation blastulae 
are included in the Dickey Amendment.”) It is also important to note how the term “embryo” has 
been expanded. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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As a rider to an appropriations bill, the original Dickey Amendment 
had a one-year period of effectiveness.112 But with some modification 
(for example, inclusion of the term “diploid cells” as a proscribed source 
of organisms),113 it has been included in federal appropriations laws 
every year since its original adoption in 1995, thus making it a de facto 
law without termination. 
4. HHS General Counsel Opinion and the NIH Draft Guidelines 
With the announcements in November 1998 from the Gearhart and 
Thomson labs described below, debate flared on whether the NIH could 
fund research on pluripotent stem cell lines derived from hESCs. Those 
who sought to limit application of the Dickey Amendment argued that 
its scope did not apply to federal funding of research with hESC-derived 
cell lines so long as federal funds were not used to create those lines. In 
January 1999, the Office of the General Counsel of HHS gave support to 
this position by opining that human pluripotent stem cells do not 
comprise an “embryo” as defined in the Dickey Amendment.114 This 
opinion turned on the view that such cells are not an “organism”—an 
undefined term used in the Dickey Amendment to define the term 
“embryo.”115 
                                                          
 112. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. 104-99, § 106, 110 Stat. 26, 27 (“Unless 
otherwise provided for in this title of this Act or in the applicable appropriations Act, appropriations 
and funds made available and authority granted pursuant to this title of this Act shall be available 
until (a) enactment into law of an appropriation for any project or activity provided for in this title 
of this Act, or (b) the enactment into law of the applicable appropriations Act without any provision 
for such project or activity, or (c) March 15, 1996, whichever first occurs.”). 
 113. Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,592 (June 22, 2007) (“[T]he term ‘human 
embryo’ shall mean any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 [C.F.R. §] 46 as of the 
date of this order, that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from 
one or more human gametes or human diploid cells.”). 
 114. JUDITH A. JOHNSON & BRIAN A. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STEM CELL 
RESEARCH 3 (1990).  
Following the November 1998 announcement on the derivation of human embryonic 
stem cells, NIH requested a legal opinion from HHS on whether federal funds could be 
used to support research on human stem cells derived from embryos or fetal tissue. The 
January 15, 1999, response from HHS General Counsel Harriet Rabb found that current 
law prohibiting the use of HHS appropriations for human embryo research [the Dickey 
Amendment] would not apply to research using human stem cells “because such cells are 
not a human embryo within the statutory definition.” The finding was based, in part, on 
HHS’s determination that the statutory ban on human embryo research defines an 
embryo as an organism. Human pluripotent stem cells are not and cannot develop into an 
organism; they lack the capacity to become organisms even if they are transferred to a 
uterus. As a result, HHS maintained that NIH could support research which uses stem 
cells but could not support research which derives stem cells from embryos. 
Id. 
 115. See supra notes 110-11.  
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To Dickey Amendment proponents, the HHS General Counsel’s 
opinion made no sense. How could federal funds be used for research 
with pluripotent stem cell lines from human blastocysts when the 
Amendment flatly prohibited the use of federal funds to create those 
lines? They argued that research using such cells was clearly within the 
intended scope of the Dickey Amendment and that the HHS General 
Counsel opinion reflected a “legalism” that violated it.116 
This argument notwithstanding, armed with the HHS General 
Counsel opinion, the NIH could continue its efforts to compose and 
begin conducting a federally-funded stem cell research program. In this 
pursuit, on August 25, 2000, after processing “approximately 50,000 
comments from members of Congress, patient advocacy groups, 
scientific societies, religious organizations, and private citizens,” the 
NIH published its final guidelines for research involving human 
pluripotent stem cells.117 While the NIH altered some wording from that 
proposed in its original draft guidelines, the thrust of the draft guidelines 
remained intact, falling into three categories: (1) assurance that the 
human embryos from which pluripotent stem cell lines would be derived 
were “in excess of clinical need”; (2) the elements of the informed 
consent required from donors of human embryos; and (3) the 
documentation to be provided with research applications or proposals on 
the provenance of the human embryos to be used.118 
5. 2001 Fact Sheet and NIH Response 
Unlike the actions of the Carter Administration in 1980, which had 
made it easy for the Reagan Administration to continue the de facto 
moratorium on embryology research, the HHS General Counsel opinion 
and NIH stem cell research guidelines from the Clinton Administration 
presented the Bush Administration with a significant challenge. And 
more significantly, whereas stem cell science was, at best, itself at an 
embryonic stage in the early 1980s, by 2001, advances in stem cell 
                                                          
 116. See Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 111, at 1367-68 (“[Raab’s] opinion was adopted 
by Harold Varmus, . . . but it caused an uproar in Congress . . . .”). 
 117. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem 
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000). The authors speculate that many of these 
comments were probably thoughtful statements from both sides of the deep rift separating the 
proponents and opponents of research with hPSCs derived from hESCs, but that a large number 
may have been short, polysyllabic messages of opposition of the sort heard in the bleachers at a 
baseball game more so than comments designed to further the deliberative process of rule-making. 
 118. Id. For example, in the final guidelines, the word “early” was dropped from the originally-
proposed term “early human embryos,” and the phrase “infertility treatment” was changed to 
“fertility treatment.” Compare Draft National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Involving 
Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,576, 67,577 (Dec. 2, 1999), with National Institutes 
of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,976-97.  
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science were sufficiently significant to be suggestive of the potential for 
using stem cells to create cures for various diseases and conditions.119 
On August 9, 2001, after months of wrestling with senior advisors’ 
differences of opinion, the Bush Administration offered a Solomonic 
solution120 in the form of a one-page “Fact Sheet,” opening with a quote 
from President Bush: “‘As a result of private research, more than 60 
genetically diverse stem cell lines already exist [and enable the 
conclusion] . . . that we should allow federal funds to be used for 
research on these existing stem cell lines ‘where the life and death 
decision has already been made.’”121 The Fact Sheet noted that three 
principal types of protection (the requirement for informed consent of 
donors; the limitation of funding for cell lines derived from excess 
embryos created solely for reproductive purposes; and the prohibition of 
any financial inducements to the donors of such excess embryos) would 
continue in effect for permitted research with such existing stem cell 
lines.122 
6. Congress Tries to Overcome the Fact Sheet and the Presidential 
Directive on Pluripotency 
From its pronouncement to the writing of this Article, the policy 
adopted in the 2001 Fact Sheet has met with ineffective opposition in 
                                                          
 119. See, e.g., William B. Huber, Letter to the Editor, The Stem Cell Decision: No End to the 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at A14. 
 120. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Bush Administration Is Split Over Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2001, at A29 (“On one side are officials . . . who emphasize that experiments with 
embryonic stem cells could lead to new treatments and cures for illnesses like diabetes and 
Parkinson’s disease. On the other side are some top presidential advisers . . . who worry that federal 
support for such research will alienate conservative voters, anti-abortion groups and the hierarchy of 
the Roman Catholic Church. . . . Accordingly, administration officials said, they are seeking a 
compromise that would take account of moral objections to the research without forfeiting its 
potential benefits . . . .”). 
 121. Press Release, supra note 82. For reasons that go beyond this Article, as of August 22, 
2008, there were twenty-one hESC cell lines meeting the federal funding eligibility criteria set forth 
in the 2001 Fact Sheet. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, Eligibility Criteria for NIH Funding of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, http://stemcells.nih.gov/research/registry/eligibilityCriteria.asp (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
 122. Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 121. Following the release of the White House Fact 
Sheet, the NIH announced the withdrawal of those sections of the previously issued NIH Guidelines 
for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells pertaining to research involving “human 
pluripotent stem cells derived: (1) From human fetal tissue; or (2) from human embryos that are the 
result of in vitro fertilization, are in excess of clinical need, and have not reached the stage at which 
the mesoderm is formed.” National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cells 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,979 (Aug. 25, 2000); see also National Institutes of 
Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells; Correction, 65 Fed. Reg. 
69,951, 69,951 (Nov. 21, 2000). Further stating that “NIH funds may not be used to derive human 
pluripotent stem cells from human embryos. These Guidelines also designate certain areas of human 
pluripotent stem cell research as ineligible for NIH funding.” Id.  
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Congress. With the Democratic victory in the 2004 election, Congress 
succeeded in passing the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005 
(“SCREA 2005,” also known as the “Castle-DeGette Bill”).123 SCREA 
2005 would have required HHS to conduct and support hESC research 
in accordance with specified ethical requirements and guidelines to be 
established in consultation with the NIH and “regardless of the date on 
which the stem cells were derived from a human embryo.”124 President 
Bush vetoed SCREA 2005—the first veto of his administration—and the 
House of Representatives could not override it.125 In 2007, a similar act 
of Congress (“SCREA 2007”) was again vetoed; and again the House 
was unable to override the veto.126 Legal commentators have been 
critical of both the assumptions and the internal logic of both the 
executive and legislative branches with respect to SCREA 2005 and 
2007, finding that neither “constitutes a logically coherent . . . policy.”127 
At the June 2007 White House press conference for the 
announcement of the veto of SCREA 2007, President Bush noted several 
technological substitutes for the use of excess preimplantation embryos 
to create pluripotent stem cells, including, for example, iPSCs (which at 
that point had not been successfully demonstrated with human cells) and 
cells extracted from amniotic fluid and placentas.128 To increase federal 
support for these efforts, President Bush, simultaneously with the veto of 
SCREA 2007, issued Executive Order 13435.129 This Order expanded 
the NIH stem cell line registry to include the new human pluripotent 
stem cell lines that would result from these embryo-free methods.130 In 
addition, the Order renamed the “Embryonic Stem Cell Registry” to the 
“Pluripotent Stem Cell Registry,” with the President explaining in his 
                                                          
 123. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2005).  
 124. Id. § 2.  
 125. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush 
Discusses Stem Cell Veto and Executive Order (June 20, 2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law 
Review).  
 126. Id. (“Last year, Congress passed a similar bill—I kept my promise by vetoing it. And 
today I’m keeping my word again: I am vetoing the bill that Congress has sent.”). 
 127. Russell Korobkin, Embryonic Histrionics: A Critical Evaluation of the Bush Stem Cell 
Funding Policy and the Congressional Alternative, 47 JURIMETRICS 1, 2 (2006).  
 128. Press Release, supra note 125. In describing iPSCs and cells extracted from amniotic and 
placental matter, President Bush acknowledged the power of embryonic cells when he stated that 
these alternative sources for pluripotent stem cell lines “could also provide stem cells that seem to 
do what embryonic cells can.” Id. However, at that date, iPSCs created with human cells had not yet 
been announced. 
 129. Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,591 (June 20, 2007).  
 130. Id. 
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news conference that this “reflects what stem cells can do, instead of 
where they come from.”131  
B. The Normative Dimension at the Federal Level 
At the federal level, as we will show below, the normative debate 
storm clouds over stem cell research had been forming well before the 
time George W. Bush was elected. These clouds had been present at 
least as early as Bill Clinton’s reaction to the announcement in 1997 of 
the first mammal—Dolly, the sheep—produced through SCNT. But the 
2001 Fact Sheet was still a crack of lightning heard around the globe. 
The Bush Administration would allow continued federal funding of 
hESC research only “on existing stem cell lines derived in accordance 
with [specified] criteria,” but would prohibit the use of federal funds for 
creating new hESC lines, creating human embryos for research 
purposes, and cloning of human embryos for any purpose.132 
Simultaneous with setting this policy, the Administration created a new 
President’s Council on Bioethics “to study the human and moral 
ramifications of developments in biomedical and behaviorial science and 
technology.”133 These developments included “embryo and stem cell 
research, assisted reproduction, cloning, genetic screening, gene therapy, 
euthanasia, psychoactive drugs, and brain implants.”134  
While the word “cloning” has a rich history in the annals of 
biotechnology,135 in this sentence that defines the mission of the 
                                                          
 131. Press Release, supra note 125. On March 9, 2009, subsequent to the submission of this 
Article, President Barrack Obama issued an Executive Order revoking the policy set forth in the 
August 9, 2001 Fact Sheet and Executive Order 13435. See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 
10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009). In addition, the March 9 Executive Order directed the NIH to draw 
guidelines for conducting NIH-funded research with both hESCs and iPSCs “to the extent permitted 
by law.” Id. Without explicit mention of the Dickey Amendment, this six-word limitation in the 
Executive Order clearly points to it and its potential to continue to limit federally funded research 
with cell lines derived from hESCs. 
 132. Press Release, supra note 82.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. (emphasis added).  
 135. Among scientists, the term “cloning” was first used in the early 1970s to describe the 
process by which DNA molecules replicate; then in the late 1970s, the term “clones” was used to 
describe the cells comprising monoclonal antibody-producing hybridoma lines; and finally in the 
1990s the term cloning came to be used as short-hand for the SCNT process. See, e.g., Process for 
Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 
1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980); Method of Producing Tumor Antibodies, U.S. Patent No. 4,172,124 
(filed Apr. 28, 1978) (issued Oct. 23, 1979); Cloning Using Donor Nuclei from a Non-Quiescent 
Somatic Cells, U.S. Patent No. 6,215,041 (filed Jan. 8, 1998) (issued Apr. 10, 2001).  
  The importance of SCNT in the sixteen year period 1980-95 is reflected in the accelerated 
rate of publication of related scientific articles during that period. As measured by the search “stem 
cell nuclear transfer” on PubMed, there were seven such articles before 1980, with the first article 
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Council, the word is meant using the SCNT technique. The sentence, 
however, did not distinguish between the two different endpoints of 
SCNT: creating a “clone” of an organism, as exemplified by Dolly, by 
implanting the blastocyst resulting from SCNT into the uterus of an 
adult organism; or creating a blastocyst from which pluripotent stem cell 
lines could be derived. This distinction seemed to be missed or confused 
among policymakers. As an example, consider the following interchange 
of questions and answers related to cloning from a press conference held 
on March 28, 2001 by then White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer: 
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, you know the President’s position on stem 
cells. 
Q: No, I know his position on embryonic stem cells. I don’t know his 
position on cloning. 
MR. FLEISCHER: But that’s not a cloning issue. You just heard the 
President’s position on cloning of humans. That’s the President’s 
position. 
Q: What about cloning human cells? 
MR. FLEISCHER: I’m not aware of the distinction between the issue 
of cloning human beings and cloning human cells.136 
This series of questions and answers and the longer interchange in 
which it occurred illustrates three points: First, the conflation of the 
debates over embryonic stem cell research and SCNT cloning; second, 
the failure of stakeholders after at least thirty years to have educated 
themselves and decisionmakers about SCNT cloning, particularly the 
difference between the use of the technique for research purposes and 
reproductive purposes; and third, and most importantly, a deep-seated, 
widely-held view on all sides of the political and religious aisle that to 
create humans in ways other than by coitus or IVF for treating infertility 
is taboo. 
1. Birth Announcement: Dolly, the SCNT-cloned Sheep 
The cloning issue had burst onto the scene following the February 
1997 announcement that a team led by Ian Wilmut at the Roslin Institute 
in Scotland had seven months earlier successfully produced Dolly, the 
                                                          
appearing in 1972. PubMed, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) 
(follow the “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then enter “stem cell nuclear transfer”; then enter 
pertinent dates). From 1980 through 1989, there were 28 such articles, or 2.8 per year. Id. For the 
four-year period 1990-93, there were 27 such articles, or 6.75 articles per year. Id. Finally, between 
1994 and June 30, 1995, there were 18 articles, or one every 30 days. Id. 
 136. Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Mar. 28, 2001) 
(on file with the Hofstra Law Review).  
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first SCNT-cloned mammal.137 Dolly’s press coverage contributed 
mightily to public perceptions of SCNT and cloning—perceptions that 
varied as a function of the political, economic, religious, and intellectual 
filters through which those perceptions formed and the variance of 
which is reflected in the state-by-state patchwork of stem cell research 
and medicine law and regulation currently in place in the United 
States.138 The reactions to Dolly’s birth announcement also illustrated 
the innate entanglement between SCNT cloning used for research 
purposes and SCNT used for reproductive purposes, an entanglement 
reflected in the excerpt above from the March 28, 2001 White House 
press briefing and exacerbated by the lack of reliable, comprehensive 
federal regulation in these overlapping areas of science and medicine.139 
2. White House Reaction to Dolly 
The Clinton Administration reacted swiftly to the news of Dolly’s 
existence. On February 24, 1997, President Clinton asked the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (“NBAC”)—a panel that he had 
formed three years earlier to address the ethical questions posed by the 
use of excess IVF embryos to create stem cell lines140—to review the 
ethical and legal issues associated with the use of cloning technology. 
Without waiting for a response, on March 4, 1997, President Clinton 
sent a memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and 
agencies—not just to HHS—making it “absolutely clear that no Federal 
funds will be used for human cloning.”141 “Clinton also urged the private 
                                                          
 137. Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 
NATURE 810, 812 (1997).  
 138. Gina Kolata, First Mammal Clone Dies; Dolly Made Science History, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2003, at A4. On February 14, 2003, Dolly was euthanized after having developed a lung 
infection. Prior to the lung infection, she suffered from arthritis (reported to be common in middle-
aged sheep) and was prone to obesity (although her weight was kept under control). Id. Four years 
before her euthanization, the team led by Dr. Wilmut had reported, subject to further confirmation, 
that the telomeres at the ends of Dolly’s chromosomes were about twenty percent shorter than those 
of non-cloned sheep of a similar age. See Gina Kolata, Cloned Sheep Showing Signs of Old Cells, 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1999, at A19. While there was some belief that the nucleus from 
the somatic cell used in the SCNT procedure gave rise to Dolly, there was also skepticism about 
this. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., AD HOC GROUP OF CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., 
supra note 104, at x (“In the continued absence of Federal funding and regulation in this area, 
preimplantation human embryo research that has been and is being conducted without Federal 
funding and regulation would continue, without consistent ethical and scientific review. It is in the 
public interest that the availability of Federal funding and regulation should provide consistent 
ethical and scientific review for this area of research.”). 
 140. Clinton, supra note 106.  
 141. William J. Clinton, President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies: Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human Beings (Mar. 4, 1997) (on file 
with the Hofstra Law Review). 
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sector to adopt a voluntary ban on the cloning of human beings.”142 In 
addition, bills were introduced in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives banning not only federally supported human cloning 
research but also human cloning.143 After NBAC reported its findings 
and recommendations in June 1997,144 the Clinton Administration sent 
to Congress the proposed Cloning and Prohibition Act of 1997, and 
within months, six additional cloning prohibition bills were 
introduced.145 
Concerned about the potential for someone, somewhere, to create a 
human through SCNT-cloning, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) sent letters to the research community stating that such an act 
would be subject to FDA regulation under the Public Health Service Act 
and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and noting that such research 
could only occur under an active investigational new drug application 
(“IND”).146 Some legal scholars believe that the FDA had no legal basis 
to assert regulatory power over cloning, finding “little evidence to 
support” the FDA’s position that “cloned human embryos are 
‘drugs’”;147 while the opposite view was taken by the biotechnology 
industry and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, which 
noted that FDA regulation of cloning would be “preferred to any new 
action by Congress.”148 
The press coverage afforded Dolly did much to create the 
widespread public perception that cloning meant the use of scientific 
techniques to create identical copies of an animal. Scientists, on the 
other hand, were also using the term cloning in the narrow sense to mean 
using SCNT to create blastocysts for deriving pluripotent stem cell lines. 
Of course, for those who wanted to ban the use of excess IVF embryos 
to produce human pluripotent stem cell lines, so too did they want to ban 
                                                          
 142. JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 5.  
 143. IRENE STITH-COLEMAN, CLONING: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV. 2 (1998) (noting the bills introduced in Congress).  
 144. The NBAC recommendations included “a continuation of the moratorium on the use of 
federal funding in the support of any attempt to create a child by SCNT, and an immediate request 
to all non-federally funded investigators to comply voluntarily with the intent of the federal 
moratorium.” JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 3. NBAC further recommended the enactment of federal 
legislation “with a 3- to 5-year sunset clause, to prohibit anyone from attempting to create a child 
through the use of SCNT in a research or clinical setting.” Id.  
 145. STITH-COLEMAN, supra note 143, at 2.  
 146. Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, Assoc. Comm’r of the Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 26, 
1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/irbletr.html.  
 147. Rick Weiss, Legal Barriers to Human Cloning May Not Hold Up, WASH. POST, May 23, 
2001, at A1. For a discussion of the problems of overlapping definitions in United States drug law, 
see PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 39-49 (3d ed. 2007).  
 148. JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 5-6. 
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SCNT for creating these cell lines. The failure to distinguish between 
these two very different uses of SCNT worked to the advantage of the 
opponents of SCNT.149 
3. The Creation of HESCs and ACT’s Proposed Test 
On November 6, 1998,150 Professor John Gearhart of Johns 
Hopkins University announced the development of a procedure for 
creating and sustaining a line of pluripotent stem cells from human fetal 
gamete cells,151 and Professor James Thomson of the University of 
Wisconsin announced the development of a procedure for creating and 
sustaining a line of embryonic stem cells from human blastocysts.152 Six 
days later, a small company in Worcester, Massachusetts, Advanced Cell 
Technology (“ACT”), announced that it had used SCNT with cow egg 
cells and nuclei from human somatic cells to create a culture of 
embryonic stem cells.153 The New York Times reported on its front page 
that the company said that it had accomplished this “feat” in 1996 and 
was announcing it “to test its public acceptability.”154 
ACT’s claims met with significant skepticism within the scientific 
community, but the Clinton Administration took the claims quite 
seriously. Expressing concern about “mingling of human and nonhuman 
species” and stressing the ethical concerns raised by ACT’s 
announcement, the President requested of NBAC a ‘‘thorough review, 
balancing all ethical and medical considerations” of embryonic stem cell 
research in general, including the hESCs reported by the Gearhart and 
Thomson labs.155 
In September 1999, NBAC, in a two-volume report, noted that: 
                                                          
 149. A 2007 report issued by the United Nations University’s Institute of Advanced Studies 
called for an urgent global ban on human cloning. See generally UNITED NATIONS UNIV., INST. OF 
ADVANCED STUDIES, IS HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING INEVITABLE: FUTURE OPTIONS FOR UN 
GOVERNANCE (2007), available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/resource_centre/Cloning_9.20B.pdf. 
However, the report did not call for a ban on therapeutic cloning. Id. at 27-29. See also generally 
Nigel M. de S. Cameron & Anna V. Henderson, Brave New World at the General Assembly: The 
United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 145, 147 (2008).  
 150. Nicholas Wade, Scientists Cultivate Cells at Root of Human Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
1998, at A1. 
 151. Id.; see also Michael J. Shamblott et al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from 
Cultured Human Primordial Germ Cells, 95 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13726, 13726 (1998).  
 152. Wade, supra note 150, at A1; see also James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell 
Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145, 1145 (1998). 
 153. Nicholas Wade, Researchers Claim Embryonic Cell Mix of Human and Cow, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1998, at A1. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Wade, supra note 81, at 31 (noting that President Clinton was more positive about the all-
human embryonic stem cell research and stating that it “‘may have real potential for treating such 
devastating illnesses as cancer, heart disease, diabetes and Parkinson’s disease’”). 
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Although wide agreement exists that human embryos deserve respect 
as a form of human life, there is disagreement both on the form such 
respect should take and on the level of protection owed at different 
stages of embryonic development. Moreover, it was clear from the 
outset that no public policy or set of recommendations could fully 
bridge these disagreements and satisfy all the thoughtful moral 
perspectives that are held by members of the American public.156 
Among the thirteen proposed recommendations proposed by 
NBAC, 
[p]erhaps the most important recommendations reflect[ed] the 
Commission’s view that federal sponsorship of research that involves 
the derivation and use of human embryonic stem (ES) cells and human 
embryonic germ (EG) cells should be limited in two ways. First, such 
research should be limited to using only two of the current sources of 
such cells; namely, cadaveric fetal material and embryos remaining 
after infertility treatments. Second, that such sponsorship be contingent 
on an appropriate and open system of national oversight and review.157 
4. Congress Takes the ACT Test: House Passes Bill, Senate Does 
Not 
In November 2001, three years after posing its first test with SCNT 
using cow eggs and human somatic cell nuclei, ACT returned with a 
second test.158 The fact pattern presented in this new test began with 
ACT’s announcement that it had created the world’s first cloned human 
embryos and that these had survived only for a few hours.159 ACT’s 
expressed intent was to use embryos of this type to derive stem cells for 
therapeutic purposes.160 
ACT’s second test came several months after the introduction of 
several bills in Congress, one of which was passed by the House of 
Representatives on July 31, 2001 and which if enacted into law prior to 
ACT’s announced work, would have potentially criminalized ACT’s 
activities.161 This Bill, H.R. 2505, called the “Human Cloning 
Prohibition Act of 2001” and which passed in the House by a vote of 
                                                          
 156. Letter from Harold T. Shapiro, Chair, Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n to President 
William Clinton (Sep. 7, 1999), in NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN STEM 
CELL RESEARCH (1999). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Gina Kolata, Company Says It Produced Embryo Clones, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at 
A14. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302 (1st Sess. 2001).  
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265 to 162, banned any use of SCNT with human cells, without regard 
as to its purpose for either reproductive or research cloning, and the 
importation of any product derived from a cloning-derived human 
embryo.162 
In addition to the introduction of H.R. 2505 during the summer 
months prior to the 2001 Fact Sheet, Representative Greenwood had 
introduced H.R. 2608, a bill that would have banned human cell SCNT 
only for the purpose of reproductive cloning.163 Supporters of H.R. 2505 
“argued that a partial ban on human cloning, such as H.R. 2608, would 
be impossible to enforce”; while “critics of H.R. 2505 argued that SCNT 
creates a ‘clump of cells’ rather than an embryo, and that [H.R. 2505] 
would curtail medical research and prevent Americans from receiving 
life-saving treatments created overseas.”164 Before the vote on H.R. 
2505, a substitute amendment for it, that was identical to H.R. 2608, 
failed with a vote of 178 to 249.165 With 2001 coming to a close, the 
Senate considered a bill like H.R. 2505 that would have imposed a six-
month moratorium on all human cloning research, but the amendment 
failed.166 
Some commentators have addressed the constitutionality of a 
federal ban on SCNT with human cells. In commenting on these 
comments, Judith A. Johnson, a Specialist in Life Sciences in the 
Domestic Social Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service, 
thoughtfully observed: 
Some legal scholars believe a ban on human cloning may be 
unconstitutional because it would infringe upon the right to make 
reproductive decisions which is “protected under the constitutional 
right to privacy and the constitutional right to liberty.” Other scholars 
do not believe that noncoital, asexual reproduction, such as cloning, 
would be considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court. 
However, in decisions involving IVF, which is noncoital but not 
asexual because both parents are required, the justices have suggested 
that reproduction by IVF is a fundamental right, but the issue is 
unresolved. A ban on human cloning research raises other 
                                                          
 162. See JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 6. It is interesting to note that H.R. 2505, also referred to 
as the “Weldon Bill,” arose from the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime. Id. Like the Dickey 
Amendment, the Weldon Amendment prohibits any federal funds from being “used to issue patents 
on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism.” NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., 
CONGRESS BANS PATENTS ON HUMAN EMBRYOS: NRLC-BACKED WELDON AMENDMENT 
SURVIVES BIO ATTACKS (2004), http://www.nrlc.org/Killing_embryos/Human_Patenting/ 
WeldonAmendmentEnacted.pdf.  
 163. See Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2608 107th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 2001). 
 164. See JOHNSON, supra note 97, at 6.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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constitutional issues: scientists’ right to personal liberty and free 
speech. In the opinion of some legal scholars, any government limits 
on the use of cloning in scientific inquiry or human reproduction 
would have to be “narrowly tailored to further a compelling state 
interest.”167 
C. The State Level 
Believing that advancements with iPSCs or directly programmed 
cells can resolve the political and religious differences that have stymied 
hESC and SCNT with human cells, a significant issue in the coming 
years will be how to harmonize, entrain, and coordinate the divergent 
array of stem cell laws that have arisen since August 2001 between and 
among the federal and state governments in the United States. For 
example, as further described in Part IV of this Article, the differences 
between Bayh-Dole and CIRM with respect to intellectual property 
licensing terms have at least the potential to remain long after possible 
resolution of the hESC controversy with the help of iPSC or directly 
programmed cell technology. 
The de facto blockade on NIH’s pursuit of a leadership position in 
hESC and human-based SCNT research created a vacuum. Arguably, the 
blockade began in September 1980 with disbanding of the EAB, but 
may not have become apparent until the issuance of the 2001 Fact 
Sheet.168 As vacuums rarely remain empty, this one was filled by the 
states, academic institutions, charitable foundations, hospitals and 
companies. Within a relatively short time following the release of the 
2001 Fact Sheet, several state legislatures had passed, or were 
considering, bills relating to various aspects of stem cell research.169 
These bills and laws filled holes in both the funding and normative 
policy-making dimensions. 
1. The Funding Dimension at the State Level 
After President Bush in August 2001 had drawn a line in the sand 
on federal funding of certain kinds of research, a range of stakeholders 
including academic institutions, philanthropists, and certain states began 
filling the vacuum. The paradox here is that by attempting to limit such 
                                                          
 167. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lori B. Andrew, Is There a Right to Clone? 
Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 643, 664, 667 
(1998)). 
 168. See Pérez-Peña, supra note 83, at 20 (describing state and private efforts to counteract the 
2001 presidential order limiting federal funding for embryonic stem cell research).  
 169. Id. States where legislation authorizing embryonic stem cell research was introduced 
included New York, Maryland, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, and Massachusetts. Id.  
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funding, the Bush policy may have encouraged more of it. Moreover, 
Richard M. Doerflinger of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops is reported to have said, “[t]he proliferation of these various 
efforts points to a need for an honest debate” on the issue of stem cell 
research and medicine.170 While iPSCs may prove in the long run to 
make this debate much less relevant, in the short run many scientists 
believe that work with hESCs must continue, if not only to validate the 
value of iPSCs171—thus making such “honest debate” still relevant, 
particularly in the context of a new federal executive administration after 
the 2008 presidential election. 
The hESC funding vacuum at the federal level was especially 
noticeable in those states that had over the course of the 1980s and 
1990s created sizeable tax and other incentives for the biotechnology 
industry to locate facilities in those states.172 The R&D in these facilities 
would continue on projects started in nearby academic laboratories 
funded, in part, by NIH grants under the Bayh-Dole regime as well as 
under the Small Business Innovative Research (“SBIR”) funding 
program.173 With a dearth of federal funds for hESC research and 
recognizing the enablement potential, it was natural for these states to 
step into this funding vacuum.174 Among the efforts to counter the ban 
on federal funding of new pluripotent stem cell lines, nine states adopted 
programs to fund such work. These nine include: California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.175 These programs range in size from $10 
million in Illinois to the $3 billion CIRM program in California.176 
                                                          
 170. Id.  
 171. See, e.g., Lief E. Fenno et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Emerging Technologies and 
Practical Applications, 18 CURRENT OPINION IN GENETICS & DEV. 324, 327-28 (2008).  
 172. See, e.g., Biotechnology Indus. Org., Solutions for Health—Economic Growth, 
http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/biotech/econgrowth.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); see also 
N.C. BIOTECHNOLOGY CTR. & N.C. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NORTH CAROLINA: THE STATE OF 
MINDS 11-13, www.ncbiotech.org/biotechnology_in_nc/stateofmindsfinal.pdf. 
 173. See, e.g., N.J. Comm’n on Sci. & Tech., SBIR/STTR Assistance and Training, 
http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/entassist/sbirsstr (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).  
 174. National Institutes of Health, Estimates of Funding for Various Diseases, Conditions, and 
Research Areas, available at http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/ (providing data as of Jan. 15, 
2009). Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2008, the NIH expended $3.815 billion on stem cell 
research, of which $282 million, or 7.39% of the total, was expended on hESC research. Id. 
 175. Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell Research, State Stem Cell Programs, 
www.iascr.org/states.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).  
 176. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STEM CELL 
RESEARCH: STATE INITIATIVES 6 (2006) (discussing an Executive Order signed by Governor 
Blagojevich, “authorizing $10 million in funding for adult, cord blood, and embryonic stem cell 
research”); Dean E. Murphy, Defying Bush Administration, Voters in California Approve $3 Billion 
for Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P10 (stating that California’s voters approved 
Proposition 71 with fifty-nine percent of the votes cast, thereby authorizing the establishment of 
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Soon after these programs were adopted, the administrators 
responsible for their implementation and operation recognized the need 
for coordination and discussion between and among them.177 To address 
this need they formed the Interstate Alliance for Stem Cell Research 
(“IASCR”).178 IASCR’s mission statement highlights that “[s]tem cell 
research programs vary considerably in scope and [in] the regulatory 
requirements that underpin them” and notes that such 
“diversity . . . could impede collaboration and the sharing of research 
materials or raise overall costs.”179 To counteract this, IASCR “provides 
a forum for information exchange and collaborative planning in an 
attempt to facilitate the sharing of data, resources, and cell lines across 
state borders to ensure the efficient development of research 
programs.”180 
2. The Normative Dimension at the State Level—A Complex 
Manifold 
Following the release of the 2001 Fact Sheet, numerous bills 
relating to stem cell research and medicine have been introduced, and in 
some cases enacted into law, in many states.181 While several states 
permit research with human embryos and cells derived from those 
embryos, many other states significantly restrict such research.182 A 
preponderance of states have passed laws that prohibit the shipment, 
transfer, or receipt for any purpose of embryos produced through 
SCNT.183 The resulting manifold of divergent state laws presents a series 
of practical questions as to how, where, and what research can occur—
questions that are particularly important to R&D collaborations and for 
follow-on use of the results of such R&D. In addition, these laws can 
                                                          
CIRM and its funding through the issuance of $3 billion of general obligation bonds at a then-
estimated cost of $6 billion payable over the next thirty years). 
 177. See Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell Research, Welcome, http://www.iascr.org (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2009). 
 178. Id. (“(IASCR) is a voluntary body whose mission is to advance stem cell research (human 
embryonic, adult, and other) by fostering effective interstate collaboration, by assisting states in 
developing research programs, and by promoting efficient and responsible use of public funds.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
 181. The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains an extensive Genetics 
Legislation Database at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/geneticsDB.cfm that 
“contains information on genetics bills considered in state legislatures from 2004 to present.” The 
primary topic areas covered in this database relevant to stem cell research and medicine include: 
ART/Frozen embryos; genetic privacy; genetics professional issues; human cloning; laboratory and 
testing standards; and research issues. 
 182. See id.; see also supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.  
 183.  A list of state laws and pending bills maintained by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures is referenced supra note 181. 
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also conflict with applicable federal laws. Part IV of this Article 
illustrates this federal versus state conflict in the context of CIRM’s 
regulations, particularly CIRM’s intellectual property regulations.184 
Beyond the state-by-state and federal versus state variation in laws 
relating to hESC research and medicine, there is also intra-state variation 
in the normative and funding dimensions. For example, consider the 
case of the State of Louisiana funding a stem cell and gene therapy 
initiative as part of the New Orleans Bioinnovation Research Center and 
LSU Health Sciences Center,185 at the same time that Louisiana state law 
prohibits research on fetuses and embryos in utero and IVF embryos186 
and the State legislature is considering laws even more restrictive than 
the current federal policy on hESC research and SCNT with human 
cells.187 Another example of this phenomenon is state laws that limit the 
extent of such research such as those that prohibit or severely restrict 
payments to oocyte donors.188 Since human eggs are a necessary starting 
material for many of the strands of work in this field of research, the 
states in question appear to be giving with one hand and taking with the 
other, or at least have not fully reconciled the policy and regulatory 
elements of their various laws. 
D. Re-engagement of the NIH 
The diversity in current and proposed state law on stem cell 
research and medicine to which IASCR’s mission points is not limited to 
state funding programs. This need will become more apparent now that 
President Obama has directed the NIH, “to the extent permitted by law,” 
to come back onto the stage to conduct and fund research with cell lines 
derived from hESCs and therapeutic SCNT with human cells.189 To the 
extent that the NIH is permitted by law to do this, a central question 
arises as to how it will seek to achieve the position of leadership it may 
have had it not been estopped from this research in August 2001, after 
over twenty years of trying to do so. Using the master clock metaphor, 
will a renewed NIH research program of this type be able to entrain 
similarly focused programs in the states? In this respect, how likely is it 
that states, having assumed jurisdiction over this type of research and 
                                                          
 184. See infra Part IV.  
 185. Welcome to the Gene Therapy Program at LSU Health Sciences Center, 
www.medschool.lsuhsc.edu/genetherapy/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
 186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (2004); see also Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 
supra note 7.  
 187. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 7.  
 188. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8(c) (West 2003).  
 189. See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009). 
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established regulatory and funding programs to pursue it, will abandon 
them, at least in advance of the NIH having “walked the walk” through 
years or even decades of proven leadership? 
Whether or not iPSCs created with somatic cells or directly 
reprogrammed somatic cells that tunnel through cell differentiation 
barriers ultimately displace pluripotent stem cell lines derived from the 
use of excess preimplantation embryos from IVF or SCNT procedures 
using human cells, the question will persist as to whether the regulatory 
system will be stuck in a suboptimal trajectory. The next Part of this 
Article discusses this possibility, by examining the intellectual property 
regulations adopted by CIRM, and contrasting the policies underlying 
that approach with those at the federal level underlying the Bayh-Dole 
Act. From whatever technology the inventions from CIRM-funded 
research arise—hESCs, human cell-based SCNT, iPSCs, direct 
reprogramming of somatic cells, or any other—if the invention owes at 
least in part to NIH and CIRM funding, there will exist tension over how 
it is to be used and who should profit from it. Beyond the limits of this 
Article are other examples of the possibility for suboptimal trajectories, 
such as in the field of informed consent rules and, again whether to limit 
research at this time to hESCs from excess preimplantation embryos, 
human cell-based SCNT, iPSCs, direct reprogrammed cells, or any other 
technology with similar application.190 
IV. LICENSING OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED STEM CELL PATENTS 
The epigraph to this Article comes from Hannah Arendt, and 
highlights how discoveries become absorbed into our daily life. That 
zone of absorption, where ideas are engineered into robust technologies 
of wide application, is one which stem cells have entered. It is a zone of 
profound interest to regulators, who can apply their skills to the problem 
and opportunity with a light touch or a heavy one. The pressure of their 
touch may be a function of the technology itself, any moral or social 
issues that are embedded in it, the legislative and political history that 
grow up around it, and also the intended scope of the regulation. There is 
also the confounding factor that regulators, of their own volition or due 
to political forces, or both, may assume the role of helmsman, 
attempting a priori to steer science to avoid or achieve very specific 
outcomes. (This point is exemplified by the September 1980 decision, 
discussed above in Part III, in which the Secretary of HEW allowed the 
                                                          
 190. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 75, at 556 (“Now, ethics oversight committees at universities 
across the United States are questioning which lines should be permissible for research—and hoping 
that another agency, such as the NIH or a state government, will make the decision for them.”). 
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disbanding of the EAB through which key NIH funding decisions were 
to have been reviewed.) 
A regulator, who wanted to enable technological innovation of all 
types, would tend to adopt general and neutral wording that aimed to 
permit, but not prescribe, private action within an acceptable range, by 
defining the limits of that range so that those within the limits could act 
with confidence and those who strayed would be checked. That light 
regulatory touch is illustrated with the Bayh-Dole Act, described above 
in Part II. If instead a regulator is asked to address a specific area of 
science to encourage its production of specific social benefits, the 
regulatory touch might be heavier, with agenda-driven goals imposed on 
every actor within the permitted range of action. That approach would 
transform the Bayh-Dole model into something that might superficially 
resemble it but in fact would operate very differently. 
The Bayh-Dole Act has defined, and empowered, technology 
transfer in the United States for a generation. Its light regulatory touch 
aims to give grantee inventors and those with whom they contract, a 
reasonable degree of certainty.191 CIRM is clearly modeled on Bayh-
Dole but deliberately departs from it in many important respects. The 
following discussion compares and contrasts key provisions of the Bayh-
Dole Act and CIRM, and ultimately proposes that CIRM’s ability to 
achieve its legislative mandate may ultimately be better enabled by 
moving away from the regulatory approach it has adopted so far, and 
toward the regulatory approach followed in the Bayh-Dole Act. 
A. Similarities to the Bayh-Dole Act 
CIRM has deliberately adopted the Bayh-Dole model in two main 
areas. One is the right of the funding agency to be kept apprised of 
progress in utilizing funded inventions, and the other is its right under 
certain circumstances to march-in on patents claiming the funded work. 
But even when CIRM emulates Bayh Dole deliberately (even down to 
using the same phrasing for invention reporting), its regulatory 
architecture produces divergence.192 CIRM asks a non-profit grantee to 
                                                          
 191. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text. 
 192. CIRM, through its Independent Citizen’s Oversight Committee (“ICOC”) has adopted two 
intellectual property policies, one for non-profit grantees and the other for for-profit ones. Each 
policy has undergone the administrative law process and (apart from minor proposed changes for 
which the comment period recently ended) each policy now has the force of law. See CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100300, 100400 (2008). The non-profit grantee regulations are found at sections 
100300-310 and those for for-profit grantees are found at sections 100400-410. Id. §§ 100300-10, 
100400-10. In adopting a dual regulatory regime, comprised of elements that are often nearly 
identical but that sometimes diverge greatly, CIRM has generated some technical difficulties. First, 
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report inventions using the very words of Bayh-Dole,193 but its for-profit 
counterparts need not report inventions themselves but only any efforts 
it makes to patent them.194 In that report, the for-profit grantee must state 
the “percentage of support provided by CIRM and by all other sources of 
funding that contributed in whole or in part to the discovery” of the 
CIRM-funded invention.195 The non-profit grantee need not do so. 
                                                          
it leads to a proliferation of terms and provisions, all of which must be mastered by those working in 
the field. Second, because the words chosen for the two regimes are often similar but not identical, 
readers will wonder if the differences are meaningful. The textual similarities and differences may 
become fertile ground for arguments in any litigation or administrative proceeding. Third, the dual 
regime implies that the two classes of grantee deserve different treatment and occupy different 
spheres; but this may not be true and, in a commercial context, it could lead to problems. The 
entities funded by CIRM, whether for-profit or not, may contribute multiple inputs to the many 
diverse and complementary technologies needed by commercial firms, and those “end user” firms 
will have to harmonize the CIRM regimes in practice. Ambiguity imperils their ability to do so. 
  On December 19, 2008, CIRM issued a Notice of Proposed Regulation Adoption and 
Repeal, which proposed to adopt Chapter 6 of Title 17 of the California Code of Regulations and 
sections 100600-11 thereunder, and to repeal Chapter 3 (sections100300-10) and Chapter 4 
(Sections 100400-10). CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., NOTICE OF PROPOSED REGULATION 
ADOPTION AND REPEAL, Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/reg/pdf 
/Oal_notice_consolidated_IPregs.pdf [hereinafter CIRM, NOTICE]. The text of the proposed 
regulation is also available at CIRM’s website. CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., 
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/reg/pdf/consolidated_regulations_OAL_notice.pdf (last visited May 14, 
2009) [hereinafter CIRM, PROPOSED REGULATIONS]. The comment period closed February 2, 2009. 
CIRM, NOTICE, supra. CIRM currently plans to issue final regulations by late August. Telephone 
Interview by Owen C.B. Hughes with Scott Tocher, Counsel to the Chair of the Indep. Citizens 
Oversight Comm., in San Francisco, Cal. (May 19, 2009). 
  As CIRM states in the Notice, the primary purpose of the proposed change is to 
“consolidate the existing regulatory framework that consists of different schemes for non-profit 
versus for-profit grantees” into what may be a “more user-friendly” set of regulations that will 
“better provide greater definition to the scope and application of the policies themselves.” CIRM, 
NOTICE, supra. The Notice reiterates that “the core principles of the CIRM intellectual property 
regulations . . . are unchanged” including mandatory programs for access by uninsured Californians 
to therapies resulting from funded work, mandatory sharing of biomaterials resulting from funded 
work that is the subject of publication, and the right of CIRM to march-in on patents covering 
funded work. Id. The proposed change would not be merely technical, however: The trigger events 
for march-in would no longer include a failure to satisfy a “public use” requirement. See CIRM, 
PROPOSED REGULATIONS, supra, § 100610(b). And the “due process” protections to grantees in a 
march-in would be somewhat better developed. Id. § 100610(e). 
  If adopted, Chapter 6 would alleviate some of the technical and drafting concerns 
expressed in Part IV of this Article, and would also reduce somewhat the lack of procedural 
protections for grantees facing an assertion of march-in rights. But the main substantive concerns 
described in Part IV would remain. See infra Part VI.B. Indeed, in terms of the compliance burden 
and the potential for collaborators and affiliates to find their own activities unexpectedly and 
disproportionately affected by CIRM’s regulatory regime, the proposed changes would not be an 
obvious improvement. 
 193. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(1) (2008), with CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100302.  
 194. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100402.  
 195. Id. § 100402; see also id. § 100302. Perhaps the non-profit grantee should volunteer such 
information to mitigate or avoid future disputes over prorating any amount otherwise due to 
California under the revenue-sharing provisions of section 100308. See supra notes 45-67. 
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As with Bayh-Dole, all CIRM grantees will file annual reports on 
how any inventions are utilized196 but the reports are different. A non-
profit grantee must use an “Invention Utilization Report”197 that closely 
tracks the requirements of Bayh-Dole,198 but a for-profit grantee is given 
no form, and is simply told to report annually “all patenting and 
Licensing Activities relating to CIRM-funded research.”199 A for-profit 
grantee must file such reports during the term of the funded work and for 
fifteen years thereafter200 but non-profit grantees must do so 
indefinitely.201 
CIRM also follows Bayh-Dole in a second main area, by giving the 
funding agency the right to march-in on intellectual property that derives 
from the funded work. But as discussed below, this similarity is more 
apparent than real; it seems likely that the practical impact of the CIRM 
march-in right will be very different from that of Bayh-Dole. 
B. Going Beyond Bayh-Dole 
These drafting variations between CIRM’s two regimes, and the 
extent to which they mirror concepts found in Bayh-Dole, are of more 
than passing interest to the practitioner, but they hardly compare in 
importance with the numerous substantive departures that CIRM has 
deliberately chosen that go well beyond the Bayh-Dole model. Those 
departures include mandatory sharing of biomedical materials;202 
mandatory revenue sharing;203 mandatory access to, and discounts for, 
products resulting from funded work;204 detailed diligence requirements 
for grantees who propose to license any funded inventions;205 and the 
manner in which the march-in rights may be exercised.206 Each of these 
features—mandatory sharing of materials, mandatory sharing of 
revenues, mandatory concessions from exclusive licensees, and the 
                                                          
 196. Compare 35 C.F.R. § 401.14(a), with CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100302(e). See supra 
55-56 and accompanying text.  
 197. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100302(e). 
 198. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(h). 
 199. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100402. 
 200. Id.  
 201. See id. § 100302(e).  
 202. Id. §§ 100304, 100404.  
 203. Id. §§ 100308, 100408.  
 204. Id. § 100407.  
 205. See id. §§ 100306(b), 100406(c)(5) (describing diligence requirements for non-profits and 
for-profits, respectively).  
 206. See id. §§ 100310, 100410 (describing how march-in rights may be exercised for non-
profits and for-profits, respectively). 
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manner in which the march-in rights may be exercised—deserves further 
attention. 
1. Mandatory Sharing of Biomedical Materials and Methods 
The CIRM requirement states that if a grantee creates “biomedical 
materials” in the course of funded work, and describes them in a 
publication,207 they must be shared with anyone else who asks to use 
them “for research purposes in California.”208 All requests must be 
honored within sixty days, at no cost or, in any case, for no more than 
the grantee’s cost.209 
This could be criticized as unfair to the grantee or to the research 
community, or both. The grantee is being made to issue what are 
implicitly if not actually research licenses to whatever it creates at no 
more than its direct cost. If this impairs its enterprise, that would 
undermine CIRM’s larger objective. If the grantee were to avoid the 
sharing requirement by not publishing, that too would tend to undermine 
CIRM’s mission. As for the research community, the sharing 
requirement arbitrarily divides it into haves and have-nots: those who 
may invoke the provision, and their unlucky colleagues across the state 
line who cannot.210 
But quite apart from those concerns, the sharing requirements rest 
on the assumption that biomedical materials, once made, can be made 
again in bulk and then shipped to strangers, all easily, safely, and 
cheaply. But this assumption may not be well-founded at all. Stem cell 
science and technology are intimately concerned with the transformative 
power of specific materials. One cell line is not like another. One growth 
factor or vector or culture medium may produce results, while others 
cannot. This means that a stem cell researcher may be extraordinarily 
interested in gaining access to exactly the same material that another has 
                                                          
 207. Id. § 100304, 100404(a) (explaining obligations for non-profits and for-profits, 
respectively). For a definition of “Biomedical Materials” see section 100301(d). For a definition of 
“Publication-related Biomedical Materials” as used for for-profits see section 100401(r).  
 208. Id. § 100304(a) (non-profit grantees). For-profit grantees face a similar requirement, “for 
bona fide purposes of research in California.” Id. § 100404(a). This adjective invites the supposition 
that non-profit grantees cannot resist even bad-faith research requests, but more seriously it leaves 
the for-profit grantee and its requesting parties the question of how bona fides are to be established. 
 209. CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGULATIONS FOR NON-PROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS – SECTIONS 100304, 100306 AND 100308, available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/reg 
/pdf/IP_ISR_non-prof.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
 210. The regulation could also be criticized for making compulsory what is, in the research 
community, a practice that is widely followed voluntarily. “Mandated generosity” is an oxymoron 
and generates no moral currency or sense of reciprocal obligation. Arguably this will do nothing to 
strengthen the culture of the research community. 
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used to achieve a result, so as to replicate or extend that result. But while 
it is easy to ask, the one asked may find it hard to deliver. Sometimes 
this stems from reluctance to help a rival or undercut a business model 
for which the material is an important asset. But more often the problem 
is simply that the material is novel or rare, and cannot be replicated 
easily. There may be no well-defined and validated methods for making 
it, for measuring what is made, or for controlling its variability from 
batch to batch. The material may have made in tiny quantities by heroic 
and ingenious methods after much expensive trial and error. Often it is a 
cell line, which is a fragile and dynamic entity, hard or impossible to 
keep stable over time or across space, particularly if it is to be shipped 
and re-established in a new setting.211 Thus, the materials covered by the 
CIRM requirement are the farthest thing from “catalog materials” 
offered by commercial vendors; yet no sooner will they have come into 
existence through the ingenuity and effort of a CIRM grantee, who then 
begins to characterize them and develop safe and efficient methods to 
make and handle them, than they may be demanded, at cost, by anyone 
seeking them for research—in California.212 The grantee, who may have 
little money and less expertise to produce batches of standardized 
material, may find this obligation to be burdensome indeed. Presumably 
it could ask for the money beforehand from CIRM, but it cannot charge 
the requesting party more than direct cost, for example, “without an 
allocation of costs for overhead, research, discovery or other non-direct 
costs of providing the material[s].”213  
CIRM may grant exceptions to non-profit grantees “[u]nder special 
circumstances”214 or to for-profit grantees if they can show financial 
hardship, direct conflict with their business, or risk to public safety or 
health.215 Alternatively, the requests may be satisfied not with physical 
                                                          
 211. E-mail from John McNeish, Executive Director, Pfizer Regenerative Medicine, to Owen 
Hughes (Apr. 3, 2009, 13:46 EST) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).  
 212. The definition of “biomedical materials” encompasses:  
Entities of biomedical relevance first produced as a consequence of CIRM-funded 
scientific research including but not limited to unique research resources such as 
synthetic compounds, organisms, cell lines, viruses, cell products, cloned DNA, as well 
as DNA sequences, mapping information, crystallographic coordinates, and 
spectroscopic data. Specific examples include specialized and/or genetically defined 
cells, including normal and diseased human cells, monoclonal antibodies, hybridoma cell 
lines, microbial cells and products, viruses and viral products, recombinant nucleic acid 
molecules, DNA probes, nucleic acid and protein sequences, certain types of animals 
including transgenic mice and other property such as computer programs.  
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100301(d). 
 213. See id. §§ 100304, 100404(a). 
 214. Id. § 100304.  
 215. Id. § 100404(c)(1)-(4).  
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material but with information; non-profit grantees must supply 
“information on how to reconstruct or obtain the material”216 while for-
profit grantees may furnish “information necessary to reconstruct or 
obtain identical material.”217 This partially alleviates the concern but 
hardly answers it. Grantees may find themselves engaged in long-
distance support efforts for dozens of frustrated researchers attempting 
to apply the experimental protocol needed to re-create the desired 
material. 
2. Revenue Sharing 
CIRM expects California to be able to recoup a portion of the 
revenue stream of any grantee, but this regulatory expectation will be 
part of the marketplace’s calculus when it tries to price any technology 
or product offered by a CIRM grantee. If CIRM’s policy imposes terms 
written in language that the market knows, such as royalty rates, the 
market can find a price for the affected property. But insofar as the terms 
are not easily priced—for example, because they appear to impose 
claims that cannot be quantified or that “reach through” to goods or 
services beyond those that are typically understood to be burdened by 
such claims—then the affected property may be slow or impossible to 
trade. As discussed below, it is possible that CIRM’s revenue-sharing 
provisions may present just such a pricing problem. 
At its core, CIRM’s revenue-sharing model is very simple: 
California wants twenty-five percent of any net revenues resulting from 
funded work. But this simple notion immediately attracts qualifiers. 
Grantees may keep all of a “threshold amount” ($500,000, adjusted for 
inflation)218 and California will share in the excess. And the actual 
inventor may have a share (the “inventor’s share”)219 which is deducted 
                                                          
 216. Id. § 100304.  
 217. Id. § 100404(d) (emphasis added). As discussed in the text, the phrase “identical material” 
suggests an assumption that (1) there are standard methods available to both the supplier of the 
material and the person requesting it that will enable the original material (the “source material”) 
and the material to be re-created or obtained (the “target material”) to be characterized on all 
dimensions of interest and (2) the results for both source and target material to be compared so as to 
ensure that they are “identical.” The phrase “identical material” may beg the question, because the 
source material is novel and may not be well-understood, and the necessary analytical and synthetic 
technologies may not exist or, in any case, may not have been validated. 
 218. The inflation adjustment is based on February 2006 for non-profit grantees, but on 
December 2007 if the grantee is a for-profit. This difference could be explained by different dates of 
adoption for the two CIRM regimes, or by a lack of editorial coordination, or both. Compare id. 
§ 100308(b), with id. § 100408(a)(1). 
 219. Id. § 100308(a). 
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before the threshold amount, and any remainder is split twenty-five 
percent to California and the balance to the grantee.220 
Then the complexities begin to mount. Some come from the 
architecture of the CIRM policies which, as noted earlier, create a dual 
regime for regulating non-profit and for-profit grantees separately. For 
example, after a non-profit grantee shares with its inventors and with 
California, its net revenues are to be applied to the “support of scientific 
research or education.”221 For-profit grantees need not reinvest their net 
revenues, but unlike non-profit grantees222 they must share with 
California some of their revenues from direct commercial sales (“Net 
Commercial Revenue”)223 as well as from licensing of CIRM-funded 
work agreements (“Net Licensing Revenue”).224 
For both types of grantees, California’s share is ratably reduced if 
parties other than CIRM were involved in the funded work. But the 
scope of the offset is differently expressed. A non-profit grantee may 
offset ratably only if others’ funds were “used in the creation of” the 
relevant patented invention225 but a for-profit grantee can do so 
whenever such funds “contributed to the development of” the 
invention.226 
The growing complexity of CIRM’s idea that revenues are to be 
shared, is seen also in the way that California seeks to share in any Net 
                                                          
 220. Id. § 100308(b). 
 221. Id. § 100308(d). 
 222. Non-profit grantees must share with California their “net revenues” from licensing, but it 
is not clear whether CIRM expects such grantees to derive any revenues from other, direct 
commercial activity such as future contract or collaboration work. Id. § 100308(a). Such work is at 
least possible. And the text is inconsistent in its usage. Subsection (a) speaks of “[n]et revenues” 
while subsection (b) says “net revenues received under a license agreement or agreements of any 
CIRM-funded patented inventions[;]” but subsection (c) uses “resultant revenues” from a “CIRM-
funded patented invention[,]” and subsection (d) says “any revenues earned as a result of a CIRM-
funded patented inventions.” Id. § 100308(a)-(d).  
 223. Id. § 100408(b). There is no analog to Net Commercial Revenues in the provision 
requiring non-profit grantees to share their revenues with California. See supra note 222.  
 224. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100408(a).  
 225. Id. § 100308(c). As noted above, supra note 222, the non-profit grantee apparently need 
not have included in its annual reporting to CIRM any notice of such additional funding sources. 
This could make for difficulties if the State were to challenge a proration of its twenty-five percent 
share, forcing the grantee to produce evidence long after the time when the additional funding 
sources had participated in the project that ultimately produced the contested revenue stream. 
 226. Id. § 100408(a)(2). The for-profit grantee must have reported the percentage of the 
various funding sources when it files its patent application. Id. § 100402(c). But again the scope of 
proration is expressed differently as “all other sources of funding that contributed in whole or in part 
to the discovery of the CIRM-funded invention.” Id. “Discovery” is not “development,” and in fact 
the latter is likely to continue well beyond the date when a patent application is filed. This 
discrepancy may produce serious disagreements over what kind of proration is permitted to for-
profit grantees in practice. 
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Commercial Revenues of for-profit grantees. Initially the grantee will 
pay California a royalty between two and five percent, with the exact 
rate to be negotiated with CIRM. Once this royalty stream227 returns to 
California an amount equal to three times its funding, the grantee’s 
payment obligations stop—unless and until its Net Commercial 
Revenues thereafter exceed $250 million in any year, which triggers a 
“milestone” to California equal to another three times its funding.228 
Then, again, the grantee’s payment obligations cease—unless and until 
its revenues exceed $500 million in any year, whereupon the same treble 
recoupment occurs, and (provided only CIRM has funded grants totaling 
at least $5 million for research “contributing to the creation of Net 
Commercial Revenue”).229 California will thereafter also receive a one 
percent royalty on all Net Commercial Revenues “in excess of $500 
million for the life of the patent.”230 
In short, for blockbuster products, California taxpayers will receive 
a nine hundred percent return on their investment as well as a continuing 
one percent royalty on the grantee’s net revenues for the life of any 
patented invention to whose development they contributed more than $5 
million in the aggregate. That is the kind of return on capital, and the 
kind of broad claim to downstream revenues, that a venture capitalist 
would be happy to see. It represents the “true cost of funds” to potential 
grantees and their investors, and they will weigh this cost when they 
assess the grant opportunity. 
A critical part of the potential grantee’s assessment will be whether 
and under what circumstances it would ever be able to resist CIRM’s 
claim to a portion of any revenues the grantee receives from any of its 
work. This is the “tracing” problem that faces all licensors and licensees 
who seek to establish a rational (and empirically ascertainable) 
                                                          
 227. This revenue stream appears to be treated independently of licensing revenues. Thus, the 
grantee will not receive any “credit” toward its payment obligations under section 100408(b) for 
any amounts that California has received under subsection (a). 
 228. Id. § 100408(b)(2). 
 229. Net Commercial Revenue is defined as “[i]ncome from commercial sales of a product(s) 
resulting from CIRM-funded Research.” Id. § 100401(n). This definition would appear to exclude 
revenue from contract services which CIRM-funded research enabled the grantee to provide. 
 230. Id. § 100408(b)(3). The reference to “the life of the patent” seems to assume that there is a 
single patent, presumably the patent claiming the CIRM-funded invention, and that the relevant Net 
Commercial Revenues are those from products or services which would be infringed by the claims 
of that patent. This linkage is not explicitly stated, however; and since Net Commercial Revenue is 
defined at section 100401(n) as “[i]ncome from commercial sales of a product(s) resulting from 
CIRM-funded Research,” it does not seem to depend upon the presence of patents at all. Nor does it 
appear to cover services. Thus, a for-profit grantee might not have to share revenues derived from 
services at all, nor (after the expiry of any CIRM-funded patents) from products, even though they 
continued to be protected by other patents. 
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connection between what is licensed and what is sold. But in the case of 
CIRM recoupment claims, the problem is exacerbated because CIRM 
can trace its contribution not only on products that would infringe a 
patented invention arising from the CIRM-funded work, but also on any 
products “resulting” (whether patents emerge or not) from “research”231 
to which CIRM has contributed anything at all. A licensee in an ordinary 
commercial negotiation would reject or strongly resist such a 
formulation. Here it is mandatory. 
The wording’s breadth also needs to be read against the likely facts. 
The applicants for CIRM funding are probably small, new businesses. 
By definition, the work that CIRM funds with them will be foundational. 
For example, its output will become input for their other and subsequent 
work. Further, being small, such grantees will have only a few projects. 
Their mission and budget will be directed toward original R&D work, 
not toward the creation of administrative processes to partition the work 
and document the effectiveness of the partitions, so as to improve their 
defense, many years later, against a claim by CIRM that its funding 
“resulted” in the product that finally enters the market. Thus the grantee 
and its investors, if prudent, will probably assume that CIRM will assert 
an interest in any commercial revenues arising from any product that 
colorably relates to the work funded by CIRM. 
In light of these factors, it will be interesting to see how many for-
profit entities accept CIRM funding232 and how the CIRM revenue-
sharing provisions are applied in practice to this research.233 
3. Mandatory Concessions by Exclusive Licensees 
Typically it takes a biopharmaceutical company over a decade, and 
often as many as fifteen years, to translate thousands of good ideas into 
one approvable product, in the course of which it will spend many 
hundreds of millions of dollars. Much of that money will be used to 
                                                          
 231. It is not impossible that CIRM could claim a series of milestones and royalties if it were to 
fund separate elements of research, each of which became a distinct contributor to the resulting 
product. The regulations do not explicitly exclude this “stacking” scenario. 
 232. As of March 2009, CIRM had awarded 279 grants for research and facilities aggregating 
over $693 million. Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., Approved CIRM Grants, 
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/info/grants.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Stanford University ranked first 
with thirty-five grants worth over $101 million. Id. The majority of the recipients appear to be 
academic or other non-profit organizations, with for-profit entities as well, such as Novocell, Inc., 
which was awarded two grants for approximately $876,000. Id. 
 233. Research is defined as “a systematic investigation, including research development, 
testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. Activities 
which meet this definition constitute research for purposes of these regulations, whether or not they 
are conducted or supported under a program which is considered research for other purposes.” CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100020(i). 
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build or gain access to thousands of tools, reagents, and other resources 
that are needed along the development path.234 Such a complex path can 
only be negotiated by following a simple strategy: that the product be 
kept as free as possible of encumbrances. The simplest form of 
encumbrance is a royalty or other revenue sharing agreement. More 
onerous and complex encumbrances can include mandatory 
participations or exclusions, performance minima, and other obligations. 
All of these burden the product opportunity and affect the developer’s 
willingness and ability to pursue it. 
CIRM’s regulations support a specific policy agenda which will 
impose additional encumbrances on products where CIRM funds any 
part of their development. As noted above, revenues from those products 
will be shared with California,235 but the producers must do more than 
share their winnings; they must also make the product or service 
available on favorable terms to certain classes of Californians, namely 
its uninsured, and those participating in the California Discount 
Prescription Drug Program (the “Program”).236 
The access plan requirements are set out at section 100407(a), 
which requires a for-profit grantee (or its exclusive licensee),237 before 
commercializing any “Drug”238 whose “development . . . was in whole 
                                                          
 234. In the case of a biopharmaceutical, such tools and technologies will include assays to 
identify and select a substance with adequate activity against the putative target (a receptor, enzyme, 
or other site of action); assays to determine toxicity of the substance (acute toxicity in key organs 
and tissues, mutagenicity, carcinogenicity, reproductive toxicity and the like); tools and materials to 
improve the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of the substance so that it can be delivered to 
the target tissue in a safe and effective dose; biomarkers to measure where the substance goes and 
what it does; methods to isolate, purify and make the substance in a safe, efficient, reproducible 
manner; methods to administer the substance in a final dosage form that is safe, sterile, convenient 
and cost-effective; and many other tools, materials and methods. See, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. 
ORG., supra note 69, at 42-44 (outlining the rigorous product development process for biotech 
products).  
 235. See supra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.  
 236. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGULATIONS FOR FOR-PROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS – SECTIONS 100407 AND 1004078, http://www.cirm.ca.gov/reg/pdf/IP_ISR.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (describing the purpose of the amendments as making these drugs more 
accessible to the uninsured).  
 237. Licensees may face claims under section 100407, whether the licensor is a for-profit or a 
non-profit grantee. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100407(b). Section 100306(d) requires licensees 
from non-profit grantees to abide by the requirements of Section 100407. Id. § 100306(d). Note that 
California Senate Bill 771 (sponsored by Senators Kuehl and Runner) would extend this obligation 
to any licensee, exclusive or not. See S.B. 771, Sen., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007).  
 238. “Drug” is defined in section 100401 as: 
(1) An article recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, Homoeopathic 
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or National Formulary, or any supplement to any of 
them; (2) an article intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease in man or other animals; or, (3) an article intended for use as a 
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or in part the result of CIRM-funded Research,”239 to submit a plan to 
afford uninsured Californians “access” to the drug. Under subsection (b) 
it must also provide the drug under the Program; then, under subsection 
(c), for any purchases of the drug under the Program that are made with 
California public funds, it cannot charge more for the drug than “any 
benchmark price” described in the Program.240 
The Law of Unintended Consequences241 is always in force, and 
particularly when broad definitions are used to drive important actions. 
Section 100407 uses an extremely broad definition of drug, so that it 
includes essentially any product or service (such as a diagnostic 
procedure) that is, or is incorporated into, a measure to care for the 
health of humans and animals.242 That definition is then combined with 
an equally sweeping definition of “research” which even partly resulted 
in the drug’s “development.”243 Anything that falls within this scope will 
be susceptible to regulatory claims that the seller must provide access 
and discounts on its product or service. 
As noted above, biopharmaceutical product development relies on 
many research tools and ancillary technologies that contribute to, but do 
not comprise, the product that is finally marketed.244 Quite apart from 
the potential of stem cells and materials derived from them to become 
therapeutic agents in themselves, it is hoped that these materials and the 
knowledge gleaned from working with them will contribute greatly to 
the development of “classic” drugs.245 But if a developer of such drugs 
were to seek an exclusive license to use research tools derived in any 
way from work funded by CIRM, it may face claims under section 
                                                          
component of any article specified in subdivision (1) or (2). This term includes 
therapeutic products such as blood, blood products, cells and cell therapies. 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100401(e) (emphasis added). 
 239. Id. § 100407(a) (emphasis added).  
 240. Id. § 100407(b)-(c). It may be asked how much incremental value these provisions deliver 
to California consumers of healthcare. Between Federal benefit programs, the Program, and a 
variety of other California programs, drugs are already available on the same or similar price terms 
as those mandated here. And because “Drug” is defined in such broad terms, the “best price” 
provisions of section 100407 would extend to products or services for which there is no pricing 
benchmark under the Program. See id. § 100401(e). 
 241. See generally Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (providing a 
definition of the commonly used term).  
 242. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100407(a) (using definition of “Drug” provided in section 
100401(e)).  
 243. Id. § 100407(a); see also id. § 100401(c) (defining CIRM-funded research as “Research 
that has been funded in whole or in part by a CIRM grant”); supra note 232 (highlighting the many 
tools and technologies required in “development”). A CIRM-funded invention could therefore 
“touch” a product at any of many points. 
 244. See supra note 233. 
 245. See BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., supra note 69, at 42. 
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100407.246 The strength of the claims will not depend on whether its 
licensor is a for-profit or a non-profit grantee,247 nor on how directly or 
materially the tool contributed to the product’s design, development, and 
success.248 In many cases, exclusivity is neither relevant nor essential to 
the licensing of inputs needed to develop the product.249 But any 
exclusive licensee will need to ask itself whether any of the licensed 
subject matter250 was funded, even partially, by CIRM.251 
C. March-In Rights 
If revenue-sharing is a way to share in the “upside” of private gain 
from public support, march-in rights are the complementary mechanism 
to avoid the “downside” of private actors failing to deliver what taxpayer 
money had begun. But, as discussed above, the march-in right is so 
strong that any exercise will overthrow the expectations not only of 
those whose funded work is at issue, but all current and prospective 
market actors.252 Thus, even though the general idea of march-in is 
simple enough, much depends on how it is actually expressed. Every 
actor and all opportunities will be affected by ambiguities over what 
property is subject to the march-in right, what events might trigger its 
exercise, and exactly what follows from its exercise. Collectively, such 
ambiguities could fully devalue the opportunities that CIRM’s funding 
was meant to support. 
                                                          
 246. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100407(b)-(c) (providing that exclusive licensees are 
subject to the same requirements as grantees).  
 247. See supra note 232.  
 248. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100308(d) (providing for sharing of revenues earned from any 
CIRM-funded patented invention). If California Senate Bill 771 were to pass, it would no longer 
depend on exclusivity. See S.B. 771, Sen., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007).  
 249. Indeed the thrust of the CIRM policies and regulations is to discourage exclusive 
licensing. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100306(b), 100406(b). 
 250. This inquiry may need to extend beyond the direct subject matter of the exclusive license 
and into the chain of title of all items used to develop it. See id. § 100401(e) (providing a broad 
definition of the term “drug”); see also id. § 100407(a) (requiring exclusive licensees to submit a 
plan to provide access to a drug if any part of its development was in part the result of CIRM-
funded research).  
 251. One indication of how the biotech community perceives the bargain offered by CIRM is a 
2006 survey taken by the California Health Institute (“CHI”), a nonprofit advocacy organization for 
California’s biomedical R&D community. Over eighty percent of the CHI members who responded 
to the survey on the then-proposed CIRM policies concerning mandated access and pricing said 
they would be “much less likely to consider licensing a technology, or investing in a start-up 
company based on a technology, that carried such pricing and access mandates.” E-mail from Dr. 
David L. Gollaher, President & CEO, Cal. Healthcare Inst., to C. Scott Tocher, Interim Counsel, 
Cal. Inst. Regenerative Med. (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.chi.org/uploadedFiles 
/Legislative_Action/State_Issues/IPPNPO%205th%20set%20comments.pdf. 
 252. See supra text accompanying footnotes 58-73.  
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This concern relates to the march-in right itself and also to any 
ambiguity or silence on the procedures that surround its application. 
May the owner of property exposed to march-in expect many, or indeed 
any, due process protections? These are what the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment253 would seem to suggest are available.254 And no less 
important than the owner’s ability to cure a taking before it occurs, or to 
seek compensation afterward: Can the owner put the moving party to its 
proof, for example by challenging the party seeking march-in in a well-
regulated process of fact-finding and adjudication? If there is such a 
process, is it overseen by an independent tribunal, whether judicial or 
administrative? Will the decision be stayed pending any appeal? Even if 
these rights are styled as “ancillary” to the central property right itself, in 
practice they matter just as much. 
1. Analysis of CIRM’s March-in Scheme 
A march-in right consists of a definition of the subject property, a 
description of the conditions that will trigger the right’s exercise, and a 
description of what will befall the subject property if the right is 
exercised. As with other concepts embodied in the CIRM regulations, 
the idea seems to be stated in simple form but closer inspection reveals a 
number of complications and questions. In part, these arise because of 
CIRM’s dual regime and its use of different words. But the more serious 
questions come not from the words that are used, but from what is not 
stated at all. 
Subject Property: CIRM’s march-in regulations define the subject 
property to include what would be covered by Bayh-Dole march-in, for 
                                                          
 253. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This protection is binding on the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment and typically a governmental taking of private property 
would trigger an eminent domain proceeding. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 
480-83 (2005). It may be, however, that California would argue that title to the affected property 
had never vested fully in the nominal owner (the CIRM grantee or its exclusive licensee). For 
example, it could be argued that the nominal owners took their rights subject to the march-in. This 
might be challenged insofar as the effect of the taking was to destroy or reduce the value of other 
property, owned outright by the grantee or its licensee, which it had created in reliance on quiet title 
in the patent being subjected to the march-in. Each argument might have merit; what is interesting 
here is not whether one side or the other might prevail in a proceeding, but that CIRM’s regulations 
make no provision for any proceeding at all. 
 254. But even these protections can differ greatly in their practical value. To avoid a taking 
altogether is generally preferable to being paid later for what was taken. Thus, while a property 
owner would take some comfort from the right, after the fact, to demand that an independent arbiter 
use established methods to assess and award “just compensation” or otherwise to recognize the 
value of what was taken, the owner typically would prefer the right, before the fact, to be given 
notice of impending exercise of the march-in right, and an opportunity to cure or challenge the 
alleged deficiency. 
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example, subject patents,255 non-profit grantees,256 or its exclusive 
licensees face march-in rights on a “CIRM-funded invention.” For-profit 
grantees may lose control of those patents and also of “data generated in 
CIRM-funded Research.”257 This goes far beyond Bayh-Dole. It would 
put for-profit grantees at risk of having to share data, such as clinical 
data used to support regulatory filings, over which they and their 
investors had expected to maintain exclusive control. It is not at all clear 
how this would work. March-in rights pertain to the licensing of 
intellectual property, typically a patent. A patent is public and a march-
in can be achieved by granting to others the right to practice its claims. 
However, patent claims typically do not cover “data” per se; and how a 
party awarded a right to use data under a march-in would actually do so, 
is far from obvious.258 The data may be of many kinds; it may be 
reliable, suspect, complete, partial; it may be public or secret; it may be 
owned by the CIRM grantee alone or with others and perhaps 
commingled with others’ data. Would the exercise of a march-in on a 
proprietary database enable CIRM to enter the grantee’s premises to 
access the database? Would the grantee be required to maintain the 
database “live” in its customary user environment? What if the database 
or other repository is not in California? Has the owner consented to 
CIRM’s jurisdiction? The CIRM decision to expand the march-in 
beyond patents is pregnant with such practical questions. 
Trigger Conditions: CIRM’s four trigger conditions, like its 
definition of subject property, are similar to Bayh-Dole, but go much 
farther. Three of them resemble, to a degree, the Bayh-Dole trigger 
conditions: that the grantee achieve practical application of the funded 
invention; that “public use” of the invention is being made; and that 
march-in is not needed for reasons of “public health and safety.”259 The 
                                                          
 255. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100310, 100410. 
 256. The same is true of for-profit grantees. Id. § 100410. For the sake of brevity, in the 
following the discussion, “grantee” includes “exclusive licensee” unless otherwise specified. 
 257. See id. § 100410(a). But see also id. § 100410(b)(1), (b)(4) (stating the property is not 
“data generated in CIRM-funded Research” but “CIRM-funded Research data”). Presumably this is 
a distinction without a difference. “CIRM-funded Research” is defined as “[r]esearch that has been 
funded in whole or in part by a CIRM Grant.” Id. § 100401(c).  
 258. See id. § 100410. 
 259. The second trigger condition, “requirements for public use,” is broader than its Bayh-Dole 
counterpart, which limits such requirements to those “specified by Federal regulations and such 
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(j)(3) (2008). 
For non-profit grantees, CIRM simply references “requirements for public use and the requirements 
have not been satisfied by the grantee.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100310(a)(3). A for-profit 
grantee is given a slightly different standard: “Fail[ure] to satisfy requirements for public use, 
including broad availability in California (for reasons other than price) in accordance with Title 17, 
California Code of Regulations, section 100407.” Id. § 100410(b)(3). This suggests that “public 
use” means something much more extensive than simply making the drug available to Californians 
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first condition is expressed in wording identical to that of Bayh-Dole, 
while the second and third use more expansive wording.260 The fourth 
condition has no Bayh-Dole analog and exposes the grantee to march-in 
if it fails to give uninsured Californians “access to resultant therapies 
and diagnostics” or “Drug[s].”261 
To avoid violating the trigger conditions, grantees will look for 
guidance; insofar as the conditions resemble those of Bayh-Dole, 
grantees may assume that CIRM will take account of the “common law” 
of Bayh-Dole policy and practice.262 This strategy will be of limited 
value for the first three conditions,263 and of no value for the fourth 
condition, as grantees attempt to create and act on a plan to make the 
product accessible to uninsured Californians. Obviously, the grantee’s 
plan, and how well it adheres to it, will be vital to its continued control 
of patents covering the CIRM-funded invention. Equally obvious, its 
plan and its adherence to the plan will be in the public eye, and will 
invite scrutiny and comment from every quarter, however ill-informed or 
intemperate. Thus, of the four trigger conditions, this might be the one 
most likely to attract the attention of a regulatory body. If that body were 
                                                          
(as required by the fourth trigger condition, discussed below), but the reader is not given any sense 
of where the boundary of the required “public use” might be. 
  The third trigger condition is based on the Bayh-Dole concept of “public health and safety 
needs” but, where the Federal requirement is that march-in is “necessary to alleviate” such needs 
because they are not being “reasonably satisfied” by the contractor, CIRM rewrites the condition for 
each of its two regimes. See id. § 100310(a)(4) (governing non-profits); id. § 100410(b)(4) 
(governing for-profits). A non-profit grantee faces the Bayh-Dole criterion (adding before “health 
and safety needs” the qualifier “public,” and after the phrase the qualifier “which needs constitute a 
public health emergency”) but a for-profit grantee is tested by whether or not it “has unreasonably 
failed to use a CIRM-funded Patented Invention or CIRM-funded Research data to alleviate public 
health or safety needs” that “constitute a public health emergency as declared by the Governor.” Id. 
§ 100410(b)(4).  
  Regarding the fourth trigger condition: Requiring an “access plan,” a non-profit grantee 
cannot “fail[] to adhere to the agreed-upon plan for access to resultant therapies” for access by 
California’s uninsured. Id. § 100310(b)(2). But a for-profit grantee will be exposed to march-in if it 
“has failed to provide or comply with a plan for access to a Drug.” Id. § 100410(b)(2). Given the 
broad definition of “Drug,” it will include measures to diagnose and prevent disease, as well as 
“resultant therapies” which is what the access plans of non-profit grantees are required to provide. 
See id. § 100401(e). 
 260. Id. §§ 100310(a)(2)-(a)(4), 100410(b)(1), (b)(3)-(b)(4).  
 261. See id. §§ 100407(a), 100306(d). 
 262. Of course, CIRM is not bound by the text of the federal law or regulations or by the 
decisions or guidance of federal agencies acting under them. Thus, even for terms that are facially 
the same as those used in Bayh-Dole, such as “practical application” of an invention, and which are 
defined in the Bayh-Dole implementing regulations at 37 C.F.R. § 401.2 but for which CIRM’s 
regulations offer no definition, CIRM may ignore the federal wording and impose its own. This 
reinforces the need for grantees to tread warily and, where possible, to ask CIRM for specific 
guidance. 
 263. See supra note 259-60. 
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ever to become vulnerable to political pressures, this is the trigger 
condition most likely to generate calls that CIRM exercise its right to 
march-in. 
Of the four conditions, failure to give uninsured Californians 
access, is the one where CIRM’s regulations give a grantee the least 
textual assurance that what it is doing is “right enough.” The regulations 
do not say how the grantee will know whether the design of its access 
plan is acceptable and whether its performance of the plan is adequate.264 
This vulnerability will encourage the prudent grantee to maintain close 
and regular contact with CIRM regarding the design and implementation 
of the plan, and to establish a record to ward off an arbitrary or 
capricious exercise of march-in rights. But while the grantee may seek 
that dialogue with CIRM, CIRM may not want to reciprocate. It has no 
jurisdiction over the programs through which healthcare is actually 
delivered to Californians, insured or otherwise. It may not have the 
expertise, the resources, or the institutional appetite to help grantees in 
this work. If CIRM does assume the role of guide or overseer of access 
plans, and if grantees relied on its advice or actions, there is nothing in 
the CIRM regulations to suggest whether California would in fact be 
bound by that advice and those actions, so as to give the relying grantee 
a defense against a march-in based on estoppel or administrative 
procedure.265 
Having defined the subject property and trigger conditions, the 
CIRM regulations then describe how a march-in will be exercised. 
Again, its dual regime adds complexity, treating non-profit grantees 
differently from for-profit ones.266 But a grantee’s more important 
                                                          
 264. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100407. 
 265. Under section 100407(a)(2), “[t]he access plan must be consistent with industry standards 
at the time of commercialization accounting for the size of the market for the Drug and the 
resources of the Grantee or its exclusive licensee.” Id. This seems to assume that there will be 
“industry standards” that can be ascertained and applied to all access plans. Under section 
100407(a)(3) the plan will be “review[ed]” by CIRM and CIRM “may make it available for review 
by the ICOC and the public.” Id. CIRM is not required to offer an opinion of the plan, or to approve 
it. If it should make the plan available for review by the ICOC and the public, and receives 
comments from them, CIRM is not required to act on them. Apart from this lack of guidance on 
access plans, the CIRM regimes differ subtly on the wording for the trigger conditions. To achieve 
“practical application” of the invention a non-profit grantee must “ma[ke] responsible efforts in a 
reasonable time.” Id. § 100310(a)(1). However, for-profit grantees must use “commercially 
reasonable efforts.” Id. § 100410(b)(1). 
 266. For a non-profit grantee, CIRM may exercise the right directly if it “determines” that any 
of the predicate conditions exists. Id. § 100310(a). In contrast, if CIRM intends to exercise the 
march-in right against a for-profit grantee, it will first ask the grantee to grant the desired march-in 
license, with respect to either a “CIRM-funded Patented Invention and/or data generated in CIRM-
funded Research.” Id. § 100410(a). Only if the grantee refuses to do so will CIRM then exercise the 
march-in by granting the license “on behalf of” the recalcitrant grantee or exclusive licensee. Id. 
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concern is how much due process protection it will be given. CIRM’s 
regulations do address this concern to a degree; CIRM must notify the 
grantee of the default and its intention to act, and, for most kinds of 
default, it will give the grantee a chance to cure the default.267 This 
outlines a notice process, while failing to help the grantee engage 
practically with CIRM. It does not tell either party how CIRM would 
explain how it arrived at its determination to march in, or how the 
grantee could offer evidence or arguments to CIRM that could correct 
factual errors or misunderstandings in whatever record CIRM had used 
to make the determination.268 In this important respect, then, the CIRM 
regulations fall short of those under Bayh-Dole, whose regulations give 
to a grantee such protections as informal notice and opportunity to 
comment; formal fact-finding with notice and the opportunity to put in 
evidence and cross-examine and otherwise challenge the evidence 
against the grantee, written records of the proceedings and the decision, 
a right to appeal an adverse result to the United States Court of Claims, 
and suspension of march-in until a final determination.269 
In light of the drastic result of a march-in determination, and the 
silence of the CIRM regulations on how grantees might engage with 
CIRM to correct errors or otherwise defend their position if a march-in 
determination is made, the prudent grantee may try to avoid a march-in 
crisis through preemptive discussions with CIRM. As discussed above, 
with respect to access plans, a grantee could find that such “self-help” is 
difficult, expensive, time-consuming, and dependent on CIRM’s ability 
and willingness to engage in such discussions. 
If, despite a grantee’s best efforts, CIRM determines to exercise its 
march-in right, the grantee has only two other procedural protections: to 
attempt a cure and, possibly, to appeal to the ICOC. 
The cure provisions state that CIRM will suspend the exercise of 
the march-in rights for up to a year if the grantee or its exclusive licensee 
“promptly takes action to cure the deficiency.”270 These provisions 
implicitly assume that the deficiency is not contested by the grantee or 
its exclusive licensee; that they and CIRM agree on a cure; and that the 
cure includes objective and reliable measures of whether it succeeded or 
                                                          
§ 100410(b). The phrase “on behalf of” suggests that CIRM may want to preserve an argument that 
it holds an agency power coupled with an interest to enter into contracts binding upon the grantee as 
the notional “principal.” Given the probability that any exercise of the power would be to the 
grantee’s immediate and severe detriment, such an argument seems problematic. 
 267. Id. §§ 100310(4)(b), 100410(c)-(d).  
 268. See id. §§ 100310, 100410.  
 269. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.  
 270. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100410(d); see also id. § 100310(b) (stating that a non-profit 
grantee must take “diligent” action to cure the deficiency). 
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not. In light of the extremely general wording of the four trigger 
conditions for march-in, those assumptions do not seem well-founded. 
As a result, what may occur, throughout the cure process, is a great deal 
of ad hoc oversight by CIRM over parties who will lack any practical or 
legal power to object to the terms of such oversight. 
A for-profit grantee has one last line of procedural defense against 
CIRM’s arbitrary exercise of the march-in right, and that is the appeals 
process.271 Such a grantee may appeal a march-in decision to the ICOC, 
by “notifying the President of the CIRM in writing within 30 days of the 
next regularly scheduled meeting of the ICOC” and “[t]he ICOC may 
reverse the decision . . . for any reason.”272 The regulation says nothing, 
however, of how (or even whether) the grantee may appear and be heard 
by ICOC, whether it may submit evidence and, if so, what evidence and 
how; whether ICOC’s deliberations will be public; whether a full record 
of the deliberations will exist and who may see it; how and when the 
results of the deliberations will issue; whether an appeal will lie from 
that result, and if so in what tribunal.273 
In summary, and in marked contrast to the considerable due process 
protections given to grantees of federal funding under Bayh-Dole, 
CIRM’s regulations afford its grantees and their licensees almost no 
practical protection against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of a 
march-in right that could strip them of the intellectual property interests 
on which their commercial success and survival may directly depend. 
2. CIRM March-In: A Hypothetical Collision 
Because CIRM’s march-in operates independently of that available 
to a funding agency under Bayh-Dole, the possibility exists that an 
invention may result from work in which both CIRM and Bayh-Dole 
funding is present.274 If so, a dual march-in scenario could arise. It is not 
clear how, or even if, that scenario would be stable or how it would 
                                                          
 271. There is no analogous right of appeal for non-profit grantees. Why they should lack this 
right is unclear. 
 272. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100410(e). 
 273. Id.  
 274. It may be objected that CIRM and NIH funding are unlikely to coexist in the same project 
because CIRM’s funding arose to fill a “vacuum” in funding by the NIH when the 2001 Fact Sheet 
was issued. It remains to been seen whether the new stance of President Obama will enable such 
funding overlaps. Whether or not that should occur, the march-in right pertains to products and 
services that are (or should be) in the stream of commerce, for example, they have arisen from the 
use of many different technological inputs. Some of those inputs may have been funded by CIRM, 
others by NIH. Given the extreme breadth of CIRM’s wording over what its march-in rights may 
cover, or by what they may be triggered (for example, access to a “Drug” where any CIRM funding 
contributed “in part” to its development), the possibility of competing march-in rights deserves 
consideration. 
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resolve. If either CIRM or the Bayh-Dole funding agency were to act, 
the other might feel obliged to act as well. For instance, if CIRM were to 
march-in on a patented drug and award a license to a generic maker275 
(“A”), the Bayh-Dole funding agency may consider A to be less qualified 
than another generic maker (“B”) and accordingly march-in and award a 
license to B. At this point, A, having agreed to the CIRM license in the 
expectation of a certain minimum demand for its output, may decide that 
B’s presence will make the project uneconomic. B will face the same 
concerns. There may also be issues with product confusion, diversion, 
regulatory acceptance, and the like. 
It may be objected that a “march-in duel” is unlikely based on the 
Bayh-Dole experience: in nearly three decades, that statute has resulted 
in initiation of only three march-in proceedings, all by the NIH, and in 
each case the NIH determined not to invoke the march-in right.276 This 
suggests that for most grantees, march-in is highly unlikely to be a 
strategy-shaping concern. But this argument comes from a regime in 
which there has been only a single funding agency with the right to 
protect its investment through exercise of the march-in right. If the 
“game” becomes one with two or more players—as it may in cases 
where research is funded by the NIH, CIRM, and other state or non-
United States government agencies—it may become unstable, and 
devolve into a classic “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game.277 In this multi-party 
funding context, the chance of a march-in may increase in a nonlinear 
catastrophic way. 
Thus, unless all those who can march-in on a given product agree to 
coordinate their action, they may frustrate each other’s exercise of the 
right. It would seem that CIRM will want to negotiate a compact—a 
“memorandum of understanding” (“MOU”)—with all other funding 
agencies278 that may have march-in rights over products where CIRM 
believes it can assert the right. In this respect, we note that CIRM has 
                                                          
 275. CIRM, as part of the California State government, would enjoy immunity from patent 
infringement claims under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Nicholas Dernik, State Sovereign 
Immunity: States Use the Federal Patent Law System as Both a Shield and a Sword, 8 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 134, 136 (2008); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But its licensee might be 
more exposed. If so, it might require CIRM to indemnify it from any claims. But if a patent holder 
could enjoin the licensee from practicing the claims of the patent on which CIRM had asserted a 
march-in right, there might be a de facto stalemate; neither CIRM’s sovereign immunity nor its 
indemnity agreement would enable the licensee to ignore the injunction. 
 276. See supra note 60. 
 277. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 8-9 (1992).  
 278. The agencies with which such an agreement might be sought could include other states, if 
they have enacted laws that impose conditions on future use of material or intellectual property 
created in their territory or with their funding. The coordination problem could become quite 
unwieldy. 
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entered into a MOU with both the State of Victoria in Australia and the 
Cancer Stem Cell Consortium of Canada relating to research 
collaborations.279 Specific questions as to whether and how either of 
these MOUs addresses the question of dual march-in rights and general 
questions as to the constitutionality and operational aspects of MOU 
provisions relating to march-in rights or other statutorily- or regulatory-
required components of government-funding programs lie beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the second half of the twentieth century, Congress acted on 
three important insights about innovation: first, government support for 
innovation is worthwhile, and may be critical, to enable academic and 
not-for-profit research institutions to advance their work in fields of 
economic, societal, and ethical significance; second, such government-
funded research can be part of a larger process of technological 
translation that turns an innovative idea into a product or service ready 
for general use; and third, to allow that process to so translate the 
innovations resulting from government-funded research, there must be a 
regime for fair and orderly licensing of the intellectual property rights in 
those results to the entities best prepared to undertake that translational 
process, whether those entities are organized for profit or not. These 
three insights, against a back-drop of a decade of nationwide economic 
duress, spurred Congress to establish such a regime through the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980. 
Bayh-Dole reflects a general approach, and its rules and processes 
can apply to any area of discovery and invention, but Bayh-Dole does 
not take account of political, cultural, and ethical considerations that 
may place certain kinds of work, otherwise scientifically meritorious, 
outside the reach of federal funding. Where such exceptions arise, as has 
happened with hESC research, the work may well continue, but in a way 
that is less efficient and orderly. As the NIH’s Human Embryo Research 
Panel noted in its 1994 report, “[i]n the continued absence of Federal 
funding and regulation in this area, preimplantation human embryo 
research that has been and is being conducted without Federal funding 
and regulation would continue, without consistent ethical and scientific 
                                                          
 279. See Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., Victoria and California Announce 
International Collaboration to Advance Stem Cell Research toward Cures (June 18, 2008), available 
at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/press/pdf/2008/06-18-08.pdf; Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative 
Med., Minister Clement, Governor Schwarzenegger Join Forces to Fight Cancer Through Stem Cell 
Research (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/press/pdf/2008/06-18-08_b.pdf.  
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review.”280 The emergence since 2001 of state-based funding and 
regulatory regimes for human stem cell research and medicine illustrates 
the accuracy of this prediction. 
Diversity is often good. It can enable systems to find novel and 
breakthrough solutions, and it can add to their value and robustness. In 
this respect, governmental philosophies that nurture hundreds of flowers 
to bloom on multiple jurisdictional levels in the field of stem cell 
research and medicine may generally be a good thing. But this diversity 
may also come at a price. The potential conflict between the intellectual 
property licensing regime under Bayh-Dole and that under the CIRM 
regulations illustrates this concern. We believe that this concern will 
only become more acute if technology such as that underlying iPSCs and 
other emerging approaches to harness changes in cell fate, reduce or 
eliminate the current ethical concerns that have, to date, limited federal 
funding for stem cell research. The effect of such advances will be to 
create a larger zone in which multiple government stakeholders, federal 
and state in the United States, as well as those in other nations, may 
participate through funding and other work. If those stakeholders do not 
follow common rules, conflict seems likely. While it is beyond the scope 
of this Article to present the details of potential solutions along these 
lines, we believe that the problem is best addressed proactively, and we 
encourage all stakeholders, on a global basis, to work in that direction. 
 
                                                          
 280. AD HOC GROUP OF CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., supra note 
104, at x.  
